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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Criminal Law-Powers of
Administrative Boards
By North Carolina statute1 any District Health .Joard was given
authority to "make such rules and regulations, . . and enforce such
penalties as in its judgment shall be necessary to protect and advance
the public health." One of the Boards provided 2 that for the violation
of its various ordinances the court should have power to punish by fine,
imprisonment, or both. In reversing a conviction under a Health Board
ordinance making it unlawful to sell milk in the District without a per-
mit, the court said that if the Board were authorized by statute to make
both the regulation and the penalty "it would run counter to the prin-
ciple that the legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law.' " 3
This case opens an inquiry as to what administrative boards are
permitted to do in the field of criminal law. Approaching the problem
logically the questions that may be raised are: (1) whether the admin-
istrative board acted within its statutory authorization, and, if so, (2)
is the statute under which it acted valid. The first question is one of
statutory construction and will not be discussed in detail here.4 The
attitude of the majority of courts has been that when there is criminal
liability attached, the regulation should clearly be warranted by the
legislative act.
The second question may be divided into four types of problems:
(A) Was the administrative body legally given authority to make the
regulation? (B) Did the legislature say that the violation of the regu-
lation was to be a crime or was authority to do this given to the admin-
istrative agency? (C) Did the legislature fix the penalty or did it
authorize the administrative agency to do so? (D) Was it the court or
the administrative body which was authorized to determine guilt or
innocence and assess the penalty?
(A) This problem involves the constitutionality of legislation author-
izing the administrative body to make rules and regulations for carrying
out a statute. Except as to municipal corporations, most of the courts
adhere to the theory that under the doctrine of separation of powers a
true legislative function cannot be delegated; but they feel that admin-
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §130-66(4) (1945 Supp.).
2 §16, Public Health Service Ordinance of the District Board of Health of the
Counties of Burke, Caldwell, and McDowell.
' State v. Curtis, 230 N. C. 169, 52 S. E. 2d 364 (1949).
' See Schwenk, The Administrative Crf me, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 51, 66 (1943).
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istrative authority to make regulations is not such a function.5 If the
act which gives the right to make the regulations sets forth the legis-
lative policy and the general standards for the administrative body to
follow, it will be called either no delegation of legislative power 6 or a
constitutional delegation. 7 Although the test which the legislative act
must meet is not always stated the same way,8 the decisions have uni-
formly upheld the act when sufficient standards were provided.
Since the result of a case may depend on whether or not the court
finds there has been a delegation of legislative power, it is best to realize
that there are, in effect, two types of legislative power-one to deter-
mine policies and the other to fill in details. When courts say that
legislative functions are non-delegable they are thinking of the former;
then in an attempt to reconcile these statements on non-delegability with
the need for administrative regulations, they have often said that the
latter power is one that is not legislative. But administrative regula-
tions, which have the force and effect of law, are certainly substantially
the same as legislation. The Wisconsin court made a clear analysis of
the situation, saying, in part, "When, however, the Legislature has laid
down these fundamentals of a law [its general purpose or policy and
the limits of its operation], it may delegate to administrative agencies
the authority to exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry
into- effect the general legislative purpose; . . . . It only leads to con-
fusion and error to say that the power to fill up the details and pro-
mulgate rules and regulations is not legislative power."
The fact that the violation of the regulations will be a crime does
not seem to vary the approach of a court in determining whether regu-
lations can be made under a particular statute. Although aware that
the regulations define the elements of a crime, the courts usually discuss
the authority to make regulations in the same manner as they do when
there is a civil penalty, adding only that a criminal penalty for the
violation does not change the result. A leading illustration of this is
'Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944).
'United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910); United States v. Tishman,
99 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 636 (1939) ; State v. Dudley,
182 N. C. 822, 109 S. E. 63 (1921).
' Lotto v. United States, 157 F. 2d 623 (8th Cir. 1946); Oklahoma v. U. S.
Civil Service Commission, 153 F. 2d 280 (10th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 U. S. 127(1947).
1 (1) The legislature can make a law to delegate a power to determine some
facts or state of facts upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own
action depend. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910) ; State v. Curtis,
230 N. C. 169, 52 S. E. 2d 364 (1949). (2) After declaring its policy and fixing
a primary standard, the legislature may leave the administrative officers power to
fill up the details by prescribing rules. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S.
388 (1935) ; Motsinger v. Perryman, 218 N. C. 15, 9 S. E. 2d 511 (1940).
° State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 505,
220 N. W. 929. 941 (1928).
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United States v. Grihnaud,10 wherein Congress had set the standards
within which the Secretary of Agriculture could make regulations to
preserve the forests and had declared that violations of the regulations
would result in criminal liability. The Supreme Court, in upholding the
defendants' conviction over the objection that it was unconstitutional
for an administrative board to declare what should be a crime, said:
". .. nor are such rules raised from an administrative to a legislative
character because the violation thereof is punished as'a public offense."
North Carolina has not altered its decisions as to the validity of the
grant of regulation-making power by reason of the fact that violation
of the regulations is a crime."1
(B) It is the norlmal procedure for a legislature to declare that any
violations of the administrative regulations will be a crime, and there
is no question as to the validity of this. This method was approved in
the Grimaud case where the Court relied heavily on the point that Con-
gress, rather than the administrative officer, had said that the failure to
obey the regulations would be a crime.
On the other hand, the authorities agree that it is unconstitutional
for the legislature to give an administrative agency power to decide
whether actions contrary to its rules should be crimes. In People v.
Grant12 the legislature said that the violation of any rule of the state
alcoholic board should be a misdemeanor if such rule so provided. In
reversing the defendant's conviction for one of these administratively
created crimes the court said: "The declaration of the crime and the
prescription of the penalty for the violation rest in the ultimate dis-
cretion of the Legislature." The same view was adopted by the Cali-
fornia court13 which said in a suit against a port authority that "no
such board or commission may declare a violation of such rules or
regulations ... to be a crime."
A method by which an administrative board may be given a share
in prescribing what shall be a crime is to grant it the power to dispense
with or suspend the operation of a law.14 In doing this the crime is set
forth by the legislature and the only power given to the agency is the
discretion to say when or upon what conditions it shall be enforced.
Such a power in an agency is not considered in the same category as
the making of a crime; therefore it is permitted when there is a suffi-
cient standard to control the agency's discretion.
10220 U. S. 506 (1910). Discussed in 1 N. C. L. REv. 50 (1922).
"' State v. Dudley, 182 N. C. 822, 109 S. E. 63 (1921) ; State v. Hodges, 180
N. C. 751, 105 S. E. 417 (1920); State v. R. R., 141 N. C. 846, 54 S. E. 294(1906); Express Co. v. R. R., 111 N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393 (1892).
"2242 App. Div. 310, 275 N. Y. S. 74 (3d Dep't. 1934), aff'd, 267 N. Y. 508,
196 N. E. 553 (1935).
x Gilgert v. Stockton Port District, 7 Cal. 2d 384, 60 P. 2d 847 (1936).
x'87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 201 (1938) contains a discussion of this power in vari-
ous fields.
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(C) Closely related to the problem of making the violation of a
regulation a crime is that of determining the penalty for a violation.
The usual legislative act includes the penalties along with the statement
that violations of the regulations are to be crimes, and there is no ques-
tion as to the legality of this technique. On the issue of whether ad-
ministrative boards can set the penalties there has been little litigation,
and much of that has dealt with civil rather than criminal penalties. 15
The cases on administrative determination of civil penalties are impor-
tant because the same court would probably have a stricter attitude
toward permitting steps which would subject a person to criminal
punishment.
In a California case16 the board had been empowered to set penalties,
not exceeding a certain amount per violation, for disobedience of its
rules and regulations. The court held that although the board could
make regulations, "the penalty for the violation of such rules and regu-
lations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature." The fact that
there was a maximum set by the legislature did not alter the opinion
of the court.
In Zuber v. Southern R. R.' 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals under-
took to interpret an earlier opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court1 8 which
had approved the fixing of civil penalties by an administrative agency.
It said that the supreme court must have felt that the legislative act
with which it was faced made it mandatory for the agency to provide
penalties for the disobedience of its regulations, and that therefore the
agency was doing what was merely an administrative action when it
determined the amount of these penalties. Nevertheless, the court of
appeals thought that unless the legislature had given at least a general
sanction to the prescription of civil or criminal penalties, no adminis-
trative board could take steps to prescribe them. It recognized that even
with the legislative directive the supreme court's decision was an ex-
tension of the Grirnaud doctrine.
In the instant case19 the legislature did not specify either that the
violation of the regulations was to be a crime or that certain penalties
were to be imposed for a violation; and since these determinations were
left to the discretion of the administrative board, the decision reversing
the conviction is in accord with the authorities above discussed. These
defects had been remedied by the legislature after the conviction below,
but the court would give no indication as tor the result under the new
statute.
1 The language of the Granut case, quoted in the previous section, indicates that
the prescribing of a criminal penalty is considered to be a legislative function.
" Board of Harbor Commissioners v. Excelsior Redwood Co., 88 Cal. 491.
26 Pac. 375 (1891).179 Ga. App. 539, 71 S. E. 937 (1911).
18 Southern R. R. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S. E. 665 (1909).
10 State v. Curtis, 230 N . C. 169, 52 S. E. 2d 364 (1949).
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(D) The determination of guilt and the imposition of punishment
for a crime are ordinarily done by the courts, with the administrative
board only instigating the prosecution of the defendant for the violation
of its rules and regulations. Whether or not an administrative board
will be permitted to impose a criminal penalty seems to depend on
whether the penalty is one that is flexible or inflexible. When an ad-
ministrative agency is given power to impose an inflexible penalty, it
amounts to nothing more than its ordinary process of finding the facts
and determining whether there has been a violation. The Supreme Court
has given its approval to the adminstrative imposition of this type pen-
alty.20  On the other hand, a flexible penalty was held unconstitutional
in Wong Wing v. United States,21 where the Commissioner of Immigra-
tion placed a punishment upon the defendant in addition to ordering him
to be deported. In Tite v. State Tax Cammission,22 where the problem
was considered at length, the Utah court said that it was permissible for
an administrative board to impose a set penalty, but not a discretionary
one. If a board does undertake to hear a case its procedure must meet
the constitutional requirement of due process. 28
Today administrative boards are given the right to impose many
civil penalties which are in effect the same or worse than criminal ones.
A fine brings an equivalent result whether levied by a board or a court,
and a license revocation by a board is often more damaging than a court
fine would be. A striking example of a civil penalty having the effect
of a criminal one is Helvering v. Mitchell,24 where a taxpayer had to
pay a fraud penalty although he had previously been acquitted on crim-
inal charges of willfully attempting to evade the income tax. When a
revenue officer determines that there has been fraud or the like, he is
doing something which is thought of as judicial, yet the courts have
not balked at permitting such determinations. Likewise in workmens'
compensation statutes there is often authorization for the board to im-
pose penalties to facilitate the functioning of the act.25 To public
utilities commissions, immigration officials, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, etc., are given broad powers to impose monetary penalties
for failure to obey the statutes and rules. Since an administrative
agency will be cognizant of the forces at work in its field, it should be
able to do an intelligent job of imposing the necessary penalties.
20 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909); Passa-
vant v. United States, 148 U. S. 214 (1892); Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263(1853).
2 163 U. S: 228 (1895).2289 Utah 404, 57 P. 2d 734 (1936).
2 Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938); National Labor Relations
Board v. Prettyman, 117 F. 2d 786 (6th Cir. 1941).
24303 U. S. 391 (1938).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §§97-18(e), 92(e) (1943); GELLHoRN, ADMINISTRATrn
LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 334 (2d ed. 1947).
[Vol. 2g
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Notwithstanding the fact that they may validly be given authority
to impose penalties, administrative boards have not yet been given the
power to order imprisonment. There is little need for administrative
boards to operate in this area, and public opinion would be strongly
against executive officials prescribing such punishment.26 In the Wong
Wing case27 the Court felt that a person should have a judicial trial
before he could be punished by having his liberty taken away.
MARSHALL T. SPEARs, JR.
Corporations-Foreign-Suability After Dissolution
Under the common law the dissolution of a corporation extinguished
its debts, actions against it were abated, its real property reverted to its
grantors, and its personal property escheated to the King.' The event
was likened to the death of a natural person.2 This rule was tolerated
so long as there were only municipal, ecclesiastical, and eleemosynary
corporations in existence. But with the growth of business corporations,
accompanied by their shareholders and creditors, the harshness of such
a rule was manifest, and the equity courts were persuaded that the assets
of a dissolved corporation should be declared a trust fund for the satis-
faction of claims by creditors and other interested parties.3 A later
development was the almost universal adoption of statutes which ex-
tended the life of a corporation after dissolution so that it could bring
and defend actions in the corporate name for the purpose of "winding
up" its affairs.
4
But extension statutes have not been completely effective, for much
confusion still exists when an action is brought involving as a party a
foreign corporation which has been dissolved by the state which created
it. In such a case the general rule is said to be that the law of the
creating state governs, and that when the corporation's very existence
is terminated by the state of domicile it cannot be a party to a suit else-
where. Similarly, if the law of the creating state extends the life of
the corporation after dissolution for a winding up period, it may gen-
erally sue or be sued in other jurisdictions because it still exists as an
entity for that purpose.6 On the other hand, these extensions may be
20 GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 25, 348.
163 U. S. 228 (1895).
See Life Ass'n. of America v. Fassett, 102 Ill. 315 (1882); 2 BEALE, CON-
FLcr oF LAws 742 (1935); 17 FLETCHER CYCL. CoRe. 775 (1942); Note, 97
A. L. R. 483 (1935).
"See Chicago Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U. S. 120, 124 (1937).
' Marcus, Suability of Dissolved Corporations, 58 HRV. L. REv. 675 (1945).
' 16 FLETCHER CYcL. CORP. 930 (1942).
*2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 742; Note, 47 A. L. R. 1288, 1557 (1927).8 Harris-Woodbury Lumber Co. v. Coffin, 179 Fed. 257 (W. D. N. C. 1910).
aff'd, 187 Fed. 1005 (4th Cir. 1911).
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termed only procedural remedies, to be controlled by the law of the
forum.7 When the law of the forum expressly extends the life of a
dissolved foreign corporation, a judgment obtained under it will be good,
at least within the jurisdictiori,8 on the theory that a state may exclude
foreign corporations completely or impose what conditions it chooses to
their admittance. Consequently, the state may force the submission to
suits after dissolution as a requisite to entrance.9 This power may also
derive from the absolute control a state has over property within its
jurisdiction, which control is not subject to the laws or acts of another
state.10 Difficulties arise because the majority of the extension statutes
do not expressly state whether they are applicable to foreign corpora-
tions or only to domestic corporations. Further, in many states an im-
portant exception to the statutory control is the rule that local creditors
may get at local assets of the dissolved foreign corporation by in ren
proceedings."
In a recent District of Columbia case,12 the plaintiff sought to enforce
a money claim in the District's municipal court against a Pennsylvania
insurance corporation which had been dissolved under Pennsylvania
law; and at the same time the plaintiff attached automobiles and funds
of the corporation in the District of Columbia. Under the Pennsyl-
vania law, title to the corporation's property was vested in a statutory
liquidator without providing for any subsequent actions in the corporate
name.'3 The District of Columbia Code provided that dissolved cor-
porations might be sued in their corporate name for causes accruing
'Peoria Engineering Co. v. Streator Cold Storage Door Co., 221 Iowa 690,
266 N. W. 548 (1936).
'Life Ass'n. of America v. Fassett, 102 Ill. 315 (1882) ; Hanger v. Inter-
national Trading Co., 184 Ky. 794, 214 S. W. 438 (1919); Stetson v. City Bank
of New Orleans, 2 Ohio St. 167 (1853); Dupont Engineering Co. v. John P.
Harvey Const. Co., 156 Va. 582, 158 S. E. 891 (1931) ; cf., Rogers v. Adriatic F.
Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 34, 42 N.E. 515 (1895) (New York refused to give full faith
and credit to an Illinois judgment because taken against a dissolved New York
corporation, but the court recognized the validity of the judgment in Illinois);
RESTATEMENT, CoNFucr or LAWS §158, Comment d (1934). For a suggestion
that such judgments should be entitled to full faith and credit everywhere, see
Marcus, supra note 3, at 694.
See Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361 (1933). There are ex-
ceptions to this power in the case of interstate commerce and federal business.
" McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 30 (U. S. 1870); City Ins. Co. v. Commercial
Bank, 68 Ill. 348 (1873).
"1 Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935); Watts v. Southern Surety Co.,
216 Iowa 150, 248 N. W. 347 (1933) (garnishment); Hibernia Nat. Bank v.
Lacombe, 27 Hun. 166 (N. Y. 1880), aff'd, 84 N. Y. 367 (1881). The in ren
proceedings also involve a determination by the local court that the corporation
exists, to the extent that it owns the property, and the cases make no distinction
in the reasoning between this and an in personam proceeding in so far as the ex-
istence of the corporation as a party is concerned.
1 Sedgwich v. Beasley, 173 F. 2d 918 (D. C. Cir. 1949); cf., Beasley v. Fox.
173 F. 2d 920 (D. C. Cir. 1949) (abatement of an action against the same defend-
ant though it was pending at the time of dissolution).1 340 P. S. PA. §206 (1930).
(Vol. 28
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prior to dissolution. 14 The Pennsylvania liquidator had an ancillary
receiver appointed in the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia, who attacked plaintiff's action on the ground that the cor-
poration was not suable because of its dissolution in Pennsylvania. The
District Court ordered that the receiver take over the attached property
and that plaintiff not proceed with his action, but this to be "without
prejudice to any lien, priority or preference" he might assert in the
receivership. On appeal the order was affirmed on the ground that
plaintiff's suit and attachment was null and void because the Pennsyl-
vania statutes did not preserve a right of action, and that in the absence
of such an extension, the corporation was "dead," just as if it were a
natural person. The District of Columbia Code was held not applicable
to foreign corporations.
The Court cites leading cases likening dissolution to the death of a
natural person, but none involved foreign corporations.1 5 The only case
cited holding that the law of the creating state controls involved an
action brought by a dissolved foreign corporation in the District of
Columbia, 6 and that Code by its terms applies only to suits against dis-
solved corporations; therefore, it could not have been applicable. The
case is silent regarding which receivership plaintiff is relegated to, and
the general rule has the ancillary receiver transmit assets direct to the
primary receiver in Pennsylvania. 7 This is subject to the court's right
to protect local creditors,' 8 but at best the plaintiff has lost some rights,
because he is not in the same position that he would be in if he had
obtained a judgment. An attachment should constitute a prior lien if
made before the foreign liquidator asserts his title, even though subse-
quent to the vesting of his title at the corporation's domicile.' 9 It is
interesting to note that had the court looked to the Pennsylvania law
applicable to such a situation, with a mind to the retaliatdry decisions
prevalent in this intergovernmental sphere, it would have found that the
Pennsylvania local law would have been applied to permit the action
against the dissolved foreign corporation.2 0
14 D. C. CODE §29-718 (1940).
"' Chicago Title Co. v. Wilcox, 302 U. S. 120 (1937) (dissolution as a bar to a
bankruptcy petition); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U. S. 257
(1927) (domestic corporation); National Bank v. Colby, 21 Wall. 609 (U. S.
18742 (a federal corporation).
Glennan v. Lincoln Inv. Corp., 110 F. 2d 130 (D. C. Cir. 1940) (policy con-
siderations favoring local creditors are not involved when the action is by the
dissolved foreign corporation).
"In re Stoddard, 242 N. Y. 148, 151 N. E. 159 (1926). See Note, 45 A. L. R632 (1926).63 See note 17 supra.
10 Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935) ; Kruger v. Bank, 123 N. C. 16, 31
S. E. 270 (1898). See Note, 98 A. L. R. 351 (1935).
" Nazareth Cement Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 116 Pa. Super. 506, 177 Atl.
64 (1935) (Louisiana dissolution receiver has no extraterritorial powers except
through comity, and that not extended when local creditors would be hurt);
Dehue v. Hillman Inv. Co., 110 F. 2d 456 (3d Cir. 1940).
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The basic dispute stems from a conflict beween the desire to insure
a pro rata distribution of the assets among all creditors by a central
receiver, and a desire to protect local creditors so that they will not have
to go to a foreign jurisdiction to prove their claim. The courts that
apply the law of the forum to permit suits against the dissolved foreign
corporation are not uniform in their reasoning. The law of the forum
may be termed remedial and thus controlling ;21 the court may presume
the foreign law is similar when it is not shown otherwise in the
record ;22 the constitutional provision for equal protection of the laws
may be held to require the same treatment for foreign as for domestic
corporations ;23 the public policy of the forum in protecting its citizens
may deny effect to the foreign law ;24 or a general statute may prohibit
any discrimination in favor of foreign corporations. 2 5  Suability is also
obtained by: attacking the jurisdiction of the dissolving court ;20 declar-
ing the dissolution not effective until judicially enforced in the forum ;27
ruling that the receiver's appearance waives his objection ;28 allowing the
action as an in rem proceeding, attachment, or garnishment ;29 or by
refusing to accept the analogy to death and cessation of existence, and
thereby allowing suit against those who stand in the corporation's place
in the corporate name.30
Much of the authority cited as holding that the foreign law governs
" Peoria Enginering Co. v. Streator Cold Storage Door Co., 221 Iowa 690,
266 N. W. 548 (1936); Stetson v. New Orleans City Bank, 2 Ohio St. 167(1853).8 Bad's, Inc. v. Frankel, 56 Ohio App. 305, 10 N. E. 2d 787 (1937).
23 Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Speer, 206 Ark. 216, 174 S. W. 2d 547
(1943).
2 4 Vladikovkazski R. R. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E.
456 (1934).
"Van Schaick v. Parsons, 11 F. Supp. 654 (D. Mont. 1935) (Nebraska judg-
ment against dissolved New York corporation enforced in Montana); Castle v.
Acrogen Coal Co., 145 Ky. 591, 140 S. W. 1034 (1911); Frink v. National Mut.
F. Ins. Co., 90 S. C. 544, 74 S. E. 33 (1912) ; McCrary Refrigerator Sales Corp.
v. Davis, 140 S. W. 2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), reVd on other grounds, 136
Tex. 296, 150 S. W. 2d 377 (1941) (action proper until the corporation's ten
year certificate expired) ; DuPont Engineering Co. v. John P. Harvey Const. Co.,
156 Va. 582, 158 S. E. 891 (1931).
Olds v. City Trust, S. D. & Surety Co., 185 Mass. 500, 70 N. E. 1022 (1904).2 7 Hammond v. National Life Ass'n., 58 App. Div. 453, 69 N. Y. S. 585 (1901).
28 McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23 (U. S. 1870) ; Trounstine v. Baur, Pogue &
Co., 44 F. Supp. 767 (S. D. N. Y. 1942), aff'd, 144 F. 2d 379 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U. S. 777 (1944).
" Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935) ; Alwart Bros. Coal Co. v. Pitts-
burgh F. Ins. Co., 253 Ill. App. 361 (1930); City Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank,
68 III. 348 (1873); Watts v. Southern Surety Co., 216 Iowa 150, 248 N. W. 347
(1933) ; Zacher v. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co., 109 Ky. 441, 59 S. W. 493
(1900); Rawlings v. American Oil Co., 173 Miss. 683, 161 So. 851 (1935);
Hibernia Nat. Bk.-v. Lacombe, 27 Hun. 166 (N. Y. 1880), aff'd, 84 N . Y. 367
(1881) ; Nazareth Cement Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 116 Pa. Super. 506, 177
Atl. 64 (1935); Davis v. Amra Grotto M.O.V.P.E.R., 169 Tenn. 564, 89 S. W.
2d 754 (1936) ; 8 THoMPsoN, CORPORATIONS §6518 (3d ed. 1927).




is found to come from cases in which the foreign law applied extends the
corporation's existence,31 or is in agreement with the local law in doing
so, thus conforming to a policy of suability and actually leaving some sort
of entity to sue or be sued.32 Of the few cases holding that the foreign
law works a bar to suits by or against the dissolved foreign corporation
in the local courts, the great majority specifically point out that the
local claimant has an equitable remedy against local assets.3 3 One Cali-
fornia case denied an action to a Nevada corporation, which would have
had capacity under California law, because its Nevada dissolution was
by way of a penalty for law violations, but this theory should not be
applicable to suits against the corporation. 34 Michigan denied an action
against a corporation because it deemed full faith and credit must be
accorded its Pennsylvania dissolution,35 but the United States Supreme
Court has held that this does not prevent local attachment of the cor-
poration's property even though title to it has passed to a statutory
liquidator by operation of the foreign law.30
North Carolina has a satute which extends dissolved corlorations for
a winding up period of three years,37 but no state case has decided
" Pendleton v. Russell, 144 U. S. 640 (1892) ; Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp.,
122 F. 2d 702 (2d Cir. 1941); Dundee Mortg. Trust Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 89 Fed.
182 (C. C. Ore. 1898); Action v. Washington Times Co., 12 F. Supp. 257 (D.
Md. 1935); Kratky v. Andrews, 244 Minn. 486, 28 N. W. 2d 624 (1947); Lehrich
v. Sixth Ave. Bancorporation, 250 App. Div. 391, 296 N. Y. S. 358 (1937) ; Kelly
v. Internat'l. Clay Products Co., 239 Pa. 383, 140 Atl. 143 (1928); Riddell v.
Rochester German Ins. Co., 35 R. I. 45, 85 Atl. 273 (1912); STEvENs, CoaRoRA-
TiONS 851 (1936); BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS 731 (1946).
" Lyman v. Knickerbocker Theatre Co., 5 F. 2d 538 (D. C. Cir. 1925) ; For-
cite Powder Co. v. Herdien, 162 Ill. App. 425 (1911) ; New England Auto Inv.
Co. v. Andrews, 47 R. I. 108, 130 At. 863 (1925) ; Floerchinger v. Sioux Falls
Gas Co., 68 S. D. 543, 5 N. W. 2d 55 (1942) ; Miller Management Co. v. State,
140 Tex. 370, 167 S. W. 2d 728 (1943); Swing v. Parkersburg Veneer & Panel
Co., 45 W. Va. 288, 31 S. E. 926 (1898).
"Marian Phosphate Co. v. Perry, 74 Fed. 425 (5th Cir. 1$96); U. S. to
use of Colonial Brick Corp. v. Federal Surety Co., 72 F. 2d 961 (4th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 294 U. S. 741 (1934); Ex parte, Davis 240 Ala. 668, 162 So. 306(1935) ; Fitts v. Nat'l. L. Ass'n., 130 Ala. 413, 30 So. 374 (1901) ; Trust Co. v.
Mortgage-Bond Co., 203 Ga. 461, 46 S. E. 2d 883 (1949) (domestic statute not used
because the New York corporation had not done business in Georgia); United
States Truck Co. v. Pennsylvania Surety Co., 259 Mich. 422, 243 N. W. 311
(1932); Hirson v. United Stores Corp., 263 App. Div. 646, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 122
(1942); Note, 27 ILL L. REv. 310 (1932). Cases not mentioning any relief;
Ralfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222 (1880) ; Gulledge Bros. Lumber Co. v. Wenatchee
Land Co., 115 Minn. 491, 132 N. W. 992 (1911); McDonald v. Pacific States Life
Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 1, 124 S. W. 2d 1157 (1939).
, Fidelity Metals Corp. v. Risley, 77 Cal. App. 2d 377, 175 P. 2d 592 (1946).
" United States Truck Co. v. Pennsylvania Surety Corp., 259 Mich. 422, 243
N. W. 311 (1932).
Clark v. Williard. 249 U. S. 211 (1935).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-132 (1943) "All corporations whose charters expire
by their own limitation or are annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, shall continue
to be bodies corporate for three years after the time when they would have been
dissolved, for purpose of prosecuting and defending actions ... to settle and close
their concerns ......
1949]
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whether it covers foreign corporations.3 8 One federal case from North
Carolina held the statute was not applicable to a dissolved New Jersey
corporation suing here, but that corporation was extended indefinitely
for winding up by the law that dissolved it and the result was to permit
the suit here six years after dissolution, whereas the North Carolina
statute would have barred the action if it had been held applicable .3
A federal court in New York disallowed North Carolina judgments
presented there as having no extraterritoriality because they were taken
against a dissolved foreign corporation, but presumably they would
have been good in North Carolina and perhaps in a third state against
assets of the corporation. 40  North Carolina refers to foreign corpora-
tions as being domesticated when they do business here and might use
that theory to apply our statute to foreign corporations. 41  Certain for-
eign corporations are required to deposit funds with the state before
being admitted, and these funds should be available to local creditors
even after the foreign dissolution of their depositor.42  North Carolina
freely allows statutory service of process against foreign corporations
which have withdrawn from the state, and might do the same when they
are dissolved on the theory that the agency for service, i.e., the Sec-
retary of State, is not revocable as to prior causes of action.48  Our
statutory service of process has been applied in the case of dissolved
8In Kruger v. Bank of Commerce, 123 N. C. 16, 31 S. E. 270 (1898), the
court held that a New York dissolution and appointment of receiver had no effect
on an attachment by local creditors of the corporation's property in North Car-
olina. Judge Clark concludes with this: "This sums up the doctrine as almost
universally recognized, and especially is this so in states like ours, in which by
statute the existance of corporations is continued for the benefit of creditors and
winding up affairs, for a prescribed time after the charter has expired or been
declared forfeited. Life Asso. v. Fossett, 102 Ill., 315." The case cited expressly
applies a domestic extension statute to a foreign corporation.
'
9Harris-Woodbury Lumber Co. v. Coffin, 179 Fed. 257 (C. C. W. D. N. C.
1910), aff'd, Coffin v. Harris-Woodbury Lumber Co., 187 Fed. 1005 (4th Cir.
1911).
40 Robinson v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 182 Fed. 850 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1910), aff'd, 189 Fed. 347 (1911); Van Schaick v. Parsons, 11 F. Supp. 654 (D.
Mont. 1935).
" John P. Nutt Corp. v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 19, 197 S. E. 534 (1938);
Smith-Douglass Co. v. Huneycutt, 204 N. C. 219, 167 S. E. 810 (1933); Troy &
N. C. Gold Mining Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 173 N. C. 593, 92 S. E. 494 (1917).
In Debnam v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 126 N. C. 831, 36 S. E. 269 (1900), the
court said that our license statute in effect created a new domestic corporation,
so as to deny it removal to the federal court. This holding, was limited in South-
ern Ry. Co. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 326 (1903), but that opinion is carefully limited
in scope to the issue of denial of federal jurisdiction. Cf. Central Motor Lines,
Inc. v. Brooks Transp. Co., 225 N. C. 733, 36 S. E. 2d 271 (1945), where our
court speaks of the Debnam case as being over-ruled, in deciding that a New
Jersey corporation which had withdrawn from the state could not be served on a
cause of action that arose elsewhere.
'
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §54-37 (1943) (bldg. & loan ass'n.); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§58-188.4 (1947 Cum. Supp.) (alien life insurance company).
" Harrison v. Corley, 226 N. C. 184, 37 S. E. 2d 489 (1946) ; State Highway




domestic corporations, and since it expressly covers foreign corporations,
service would be no problem if the corporation was found to be ex-
tended, either by the North Carolina statute or the foreign law.44
The consideration of federal jurisdiction of these cases is important
because nearly all of them could go to the federal courts on diversity of
citizenship. If Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) 45 is controlling,
the question presented here is foreclosed because the rule provides that
the capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the
law under which it was organized. The principal case refers to this as
being "merely expressive of the general law," pointedly refraining from
citing it as controlling. The difficulty arises from the dictum of Angel v.
Bullington46 that a Federal court in a diversity case is just another
state court and cannot entertain causes that the state court would not
entertain. 47 Similar reasoning would not allow removal on diversity of
citizenship to defeat a remedy which the plaintiff had in the state court. 48
If, under its conflict of laws rule, North Carolina regarded its local
statute as controlling the extension of the local existence of a dissolved
foreign corporation, then the Federal court in North Carolina would
be bound by the rule of the forum 49 and Rule 17(b) would again be of
doubtful value as a defense to the dissolved corporation. And though
constitutional questions of full faith and credit, equal protection of
laws, and impairment of contracts have been raised in these actions,
they would not be in the complaint against a foreign corporation in
the state court; therefore, the corporation could not get removal to the
Federal court on the grounds of a federal question at issue in order to
defeat the diversity difficulty50 There is the additional possibility that
removal on diversity grounds might also be lost if the suggestions
made in federal bankruptcy cases are followed to the effect that when a
corporation is dissolved it can be brought in as an unincorporated asso-
ciation,51 as every member might not have complete diversity. This
approach is exemplified by the treatment of a dissolved foreign cor-
poration as a domestic de facto corporation to allow suit.52
"' Sisk v. Old Hickory Motor Freight, 222 N. C. 631, 24 S. E. 2d 488 (1943).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-38 (1943) (if foreign corporation fails to appoint a process
agent, service may be had on the Secretary of State). N. C. GEN. STAT §58-50
(1943) (statutory process agent for a foreign insurance company is irrevocable).
"See 58 HtAv. L. REv. 675, 691 for criticism of the rule.
40330 U. S. 183 (1946).
"In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 307 (1947), the court
carefully limits the scope of this rule.
" 3 MooRe's FEDERAL PRAcTICE 1397-98 (2d ed. 1948).
" Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941).
o Tennessee v. Union and Planter's Bank, 152 U. S. 454 (1894).
"Peer Manor Bldg. Corp., 143 F. 2d 769 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U. S. 757 (1944). Contra: Matter of Midwest Athletic Club, 161 F. 2d 1005(7th Cir. 1947). 6 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 4.05 [5] (14th ed. 1942).
"' Life Ass'n of America v. Fassett, 102 I1. 315 (1882); Rogers v. Adriatic
F. Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 34, 42 N. E. 515 (1895).
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The free dissolution, both voluntary and involuntary, of modern cor-
porations should not defeat their suability in other sovereign states.5
3
The analogy of dissolution to natural death in its old aspect is fallacious,
in that it carries forward the common law conception of evaporation of
the corporation, whereas today there are shareholders, assets, and suc-
cessors to wind up its affairs and they should answer to suits brought
in the corporate name. The corporate entity does not extend beyond
the borders of its creating state until another state admits it, and when
so admitted, some new sort of entity is reincorporated which should not
be said to "die" when the other state dissolves that which it created. 4
The local forum can subscribe to pro rata distribution of assets and still
protect local creditors by giving them their share out of local assets,
and thus not force them to go to the creating jurisdiction with their
claim.55 Corporations should no longer be able to defeat civil and
criminal actions brought against them by working a dissolution in the
creating state, only to reappear the next day in identical form with a
new charter. 56 With the present ability of corporations to shop for the
most advantageous state corporation law, the only other real solution
would be the drastic legislation already introduced in Coilgress requiring
a federal charter for all corporations engaging in interstate commerce. 5T
EDWARD B. Hipp.
Corporations-Taxation-Status of Payments to Hybrid
Security Holders
It often becomes necessary for a court to determine whether certain
hybrid securities are in fact stocks or bonds.1 This determination is
frequently essential in order to ascertain whether periodic payments by
a corporation to the holders of its securities should be classified as
interest on indebtedness, which is deductable from gross income for
income tax purposes, 2 or as dividends to stockholders, which are not
"
3See note 3 supra.5 4 HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 278 and 313 (1923).
Notes, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 306 (1947), 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 283 (1936).
' See note 3 mspra.
" U. S. News & World Report, Oct. 14, 1949, p. 30. Cf. English Companies
Act (1929) §338(2) (providing that foreign corporations be wound up as un-
registered companies despite dissolution by the creating state).
1 The distinction between these securities must in many cases be ascertained
in order for the court to establish the priority between a certificate holder and
general unsecured or subsequent secured creditors of the corporation. Warren v.
King, 108 U. S. 389 (1883) (foreclosure proceeding) ; Mathews v. Bradford, 70
F. 2d 77 (6th Cir. 1934) (receivership proceeding); Spencer v. Smith, 201 Fed.
647 (8th Cir. 1912) (bankruptcy proceeding); Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp.
229 (E. D. Ky. 1935) (reorganization proceeding).
2 INT. REv. CODE §23. "In computing net income there shall be allowed as
deductions: (b) Interest.-All interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on




In the recent case of Bowersock Mills and Power Company v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue,4 the court was faced with this issue. In
that case, a closely held corporation, 5 so that it might be in a position
to obtain bank credit, issued preferred stock to its bondholders (the
Bowersock Trust, hereinafter referred to as the Trust) in payment of
the bonds with accrued interest. The Trust further agreed to release
the first deed of Trust on the corporation's assets. The above-mentioned
stock was to be preferred both as to dividends and as to assets; bear
cumulative dividends of three per cent payable annually if the net earn-
ings at the time should be sufficient to pay such dividends; carry voting
rights equal to those carried by common st6ck in the case of sale, mort-
gage or pledge of the fixed assets of the corporation and in case of
other fundamental changes in the corporation; be retirable at par plus
accrued dividends on call of the corporation; provided that if any divi-
dends in excess of three per cent were declared on the common in any
year, one half of such excess was to be paid on the preferred stock as
an additional dividend.
Simultaneously with the issuance of the stock, the common stock-
holders entered into a contract with the Trust whereby the common
stockholders agreed to buy and the Trust to sell the preferred stock, a
certain number of shares per year, provided the corporation had not
redeemed that amount within the prescribed period. To insure pay-
ment of the dividends and repurchase of the preferred stock, the com-
mon stockholders agreed to put their stock in trust, on condition that
in the event of default of the corporation on the dividends for a period
of six months, or the failure of the common stockholders to cause the
corporation to purchase the stock as provided in the contract, the com-
mon stock would be transferred to the Bowersock Trust as liquidated
damages.
The majority opinion of the court held that inasmuch as the cor-
poration was closely held, considering the two contracts together was
obligatory. By so doing, it became evident that the real intention of the
parties was merely to change the form of the indebtedness, thereby
subordinating it to bank credit, and that the parties intended to and did
retain a debtor-creditor relationship. Following this reasoning, the court
held that the payments fell into the category bf interest and were there-
fore deductable.
gations (other than obligations of the United States issued after September 24,
1917, and originally subscribed for by the taxpayer) the interest upon which is
wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this chapter."
14 MERTENs, LAW oF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATioN §26.10 (1942).
'172 F. 2d 904 (10th Cir. 1949).
'All of the outstanding stock was held by one family.
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The dissenting judge felt that the contract between the corporation
and the Trust clearly created a shareholder relationship and that the
second contract did not alter this relation, as that contract was solely
between the common stockholders and the Trust.
A persuasive argument is advanced by the majority in that it is
more realistic to disregard the corporate entity in the case of a closely
held corporation. It is recognized that in a proper case it is equitable
to look behind the corporate entity,6 but it is submitted that this is not
such a case. The corporation neither assumed any liabilities nor ob-
tained any benefits under the contract between the common stockholders
and the Trust. Furthermore, the corporation and its stockholders are
taxed separately and it would, therefore, seem more logical to consider
only the contract between the corporation and the Trust in determining
the tax liability of the corporation.
Furthermore, there is authority in support of the proposition that
where the payment of dividends on, or the redemption of, preferred
stock is guaranteed by one other than the issuing corporation, the under-
takings are separate and the stockholder relationship does not become a
creditor relationship. 7  Some cases so hold even where the issuing cor-
poration guarantees the payment of the periodic dividends.8
In deciding whether the payments are interest or dividends, the
"traditonal approach" is to consider the factors indicating a shareholder
relationship and those indicating a debtor-creditor relationship and to
conclude that the security more nearly resembles, and therefore should
for all purposes be treated as bonds or as stocks.9
Evaluation of the weight assigned by the courts to each indi-
vidual factor is difficult. Occasionally a particular element is pro-
nounced decisive, but more often a combination of the elements present
in the case sways the judgment. The determining factors are usually
listed as: the name given to the certificates ;1o the presence or absence
' As was stated by Judge Sanborn in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator
Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1905) "A corporation will be looked upon as a
legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears;
but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons."
Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyke and Reeves, 8 F. 2d 716 (2d Cir. 1925),
cert. denied sub norn Van Dyke v. Young, 269 U. S. 570 (1925) (guaranteed by
Ellis and Reeves, principal stockholders) ; Northern Refrigerator Lines, Inc. v.
Commission of Internal Revenue, 1 T. C. 824 (1943) (guaranteed by another cor-
poration holding the common stock) ; McCoy-Garten Realty Co., 14 B. T. A. 853(1928). See note 88 A. L. R. 1131, 1143 (1934) and cases cited.
' Leasehold Realty Co., 3 B. T. A. 1129 (1926); see 1 MACHEN, MODERN LAW
OF CORPORATIONS §542 (1908) where it is pointed out that "courts construe such a
guaranty to apply only to payment out of funds legally available for dividends."
94 M1fERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §26.10 (1942). A recent case
following this approach is Jordan Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5
C. C. H. 1949 Fed. Tax Rep. 19372 (D. C. 1949).
" The courts vary as to the amount of weight they will give to the name of
[Vol. 28
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of a definite maturity date with a right to enforce the payment of prin-
cipal and interest ;11 status equal to or inferior to that of regular cor-
porate creditors ;12 the presence or absence of voting rights ;13 the right
to participate in dividends after common stock has received a percentage
equal to preferred ;14 the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the
certificates ;15 and the intention of the parties.16
The majority of the court in the principal case did not specifically
follow the "traditional approach," but they did appear to make the fac-
tors of intention and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the
certificates controlling.17
It is submitted that it would be better not to follow the "traditional
approach" of balancing the provisions of the security as a whole and
discovering whether the security more nearly resembles bonds or shares
the security. Some cases appear to give it little; see Jewel Tea Co. v. United
States, 90 F. 2d 451 (2d Cir. 1937), while others appear to give it considerable
weight. Mathews v. Bradford, 70 F. 2d 77 (6th Cir. 1934) ("intention to create
debt must be clear and convincir;g. where called stock"); Spencer v. Smith, 201
Fed. 647 (8th Cir. 1912) ; Leasehold Realty Co., supra note 8.
There are certain cases in which the corporation should be estopped to deny
that the certificate is something other than the name given it. E.g., creditors may
have extended credit relying on the fact that outstanding securities labeled pre-
ferred stock were stock and not bonds and that the holders therefore had a claim
on the corporate assets inferior to his claim. Cf. Gallatin Farmers Co. v. Com-
missioner of Iternal Revenue, 132 F. 2d 706 (9th Cir. 1942) ; 1 MACHEN, MODERN
LAW OF CORPORATIONS §547 (1908).
It is submitted that the courts could follow, in tax cases, the rule that the cor-
poration was aware of the taxable consequences of the label placed on the certif-
icates and that it should be bound by its election except in cases where the form
used was obviously fictitious on its face. This rule would have the advantage
of facilitating the disposition of the cases without allowing a corporation to evade
taxes by giving the security an artificial name.
"Finance and Investment Corp. v. Burnet, 57 F. 2d 444 (App. D. C. 1932).
Some cases treat this factor as the most important. As was stated in United
States v. South Ga. Ry., 107 F. 2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1939) "There is, thus, an entire
absence here of the most significant, if not the essential feature of a debtor and
creditor and opposed to a stockholder relationship, the existence of a fixed maturity
for the principal with the right to force payment of the sum as a debt in the event
of default."
'u Helvering v. Richmond, F. and P. Ry., 90 F. 2d 971 (4th Cir. 1937).
x' This factor seems to be frequently discussed but seldom given much weight.
Although the voting privilege is usually extended only to shareholders, preferred
stock is often issued with an express provision that it is to have no voting rights.
11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, §5301 (perm. ed. 1931).
"See Cass v. Realty Securities Co., 148 App. Div. 96, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1074
(1941).
" See Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E. 496 (1890) (certificates
were issued under a statute which authorized issuance of preferred stock but not
certificates of indebtness. Therefore, held to be certificates of preferred stock
even though contained many elements of indebtness).
1" Schmoll Fits Associated v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 39 B. T. A.
411 (1939).
1 Had the court, in the principal case, held that the two contracts were separate,
the securities would clearly have been stocks under the traditional approach. They
were called preferred stock; dividends were payable only out of earnings; they
had no fixed maturity date; they carried voting rights for certain purposes; and
they were to an extent participating-all of which are characteristics of stocks
rather than bonds.
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of stock with a view to imposing all the legal consequences generally
associated with the particular label given the security. This approach
may cause a decision to rest on considerations not necessarily relevant
to the question before the court. E.g., in the principal case the factors
of intention and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the certif-
icates do not seem to be necessarily relevant in determining whether or
not the periodic payments are a definite and fixed obligation on the part
of the corporation regardless of earnings.
It would appear to be a sounder approach to limit the inquiry to the
characteristics of the security material to the particular question before
the court and cause the judgment to depend not on the entire complex
of attributes but on those aspects determined to be pertinent to the par-
ticular issue under consideration.
Under this analysis the court, in cases involving the taxability of
periodic payments made by a corporation to its security holders and
guaranteed by a third party, could narrow the issue to: Are these pay-
ments a definite obligation of the corporation regardless of earnings?
The guaranty by the third party should be disregarded in that the cor-
poration and the third party are taxed individually and only the tax
liability of the corporation is involved.
RODDEY M. LiGON, JR.
Courts-Venue-Inconvenient Forum Considerations and Special
Venue Provisions Under the New Judicial Code*
The new Judicial Code," effective September 1, 1948, gave the fed-
eral courts in §1404(a) 2 the power to transfer a civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought if necessary for
the convenience of witnesses and in the interest of justice. Prior to
this revised code, there was no provision in the federal statutes for the
transfer of venue from one district to another district; but where more
than one venue was available to a plaintiff, the federal courts could exer-
cise the equitable right to dismiss a case without prejudice and thus
force the plaintiff to sue over again somewhere else.3 Both before and
after final approval of §1404(a), there was speculation by writers as
to the effect of this new power on actions arising under special venue
* For some interesting discussions of other problems presented by §1404 (a), see
Mangan, Federal Legislation, 37 GEo. L. J. 394, 400 (1949) ; Marcus, The Supreme
Court and the Antitrust Laws, 37 GEo. L. J. 341, 356 (1949) ; Notes, 60 HAV. L.
REv. 424 (1947), 23 IND. L. J. 82 (1947) ; and materials listed in footnote 4 infra.
Title 28 U. S. C. C. S.
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought."
'Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947) ; Koster v. Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1947); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288
U. S. 123, 130-131 (1932).
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provisions4 where the rule enunciated had been that special venue stat-
utes created an absolute right not subject to interference either by in-
junction or in any other manner except legislation. 5
Taking advantage of the new provisions of §1404(a) the federal
district courts, presented with motions subsequent to September 1, 1948,
to transfer the causes in several Federal Employer's Liability Act cases
and an antitrust action, almost without exception 6 held that §1404(a)
applied to the special venue provisions of the FELA and the antitrust
law.7
In the early summer of 1949, the United States Supreme Court con-
strued §1404(a) in three cases, two involving FELA actions8 and one
involving an antitrust action.9 In all three the result was an express
declaration by the majority of the court 10 that the phrase "any civil
action" as used in §1404(a) is not limited as embracing only those
actions for which venue requirements are prescribed in 28 U. S. C.
§§1391-1406, but means just what it says-any civil action.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court said that "the reach of 'any
civil action' is unmistakable. The phrase is used without qualification,
' Barnard and Zlinkoff, Patents, Procedure and the Sherman Act-The Supreme
Court and a Competitive Economy, 1947 Term, 17 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 10-18
(1949) (thought §1404(a) should not apply to antitrust suits in absence of clearer
and more specific evidence of congressional intent to accomplish such a result);
Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908 (1947) (if
enacted and sympathetically interpreted, §1404(a) should go far to relieve the
federal judiciary of self-imposed obstacles to the efficient administration of the
law governing place of trial) ; Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 248 (1949) (hope expressed
that §1404(a) would be held applicable in cases arising under general and special
venue provisions); Comment, 44 ILL. L. REv. 75 (1949) (feels that §1404(a)
should apply to FELA suits) ; Comment, 56 YALE L. J. 1234, 1249 n. 115 (1947)
(thought §1404(a), if enacted, would be a legislative overruling of the court's
interpretation of special venue provisions of the FELA); Note, 56 YALE L. J.
482 (1949) (thinks §1404(a) should apply to antitrust suits) ; 62 HARV. L. Rev.
707 (1949) (§1404(a) should apply to antitrust suits); 47 MicH. L. REv. 438
(1949) (application of §1404(a) to FELA suits is proper) ; 33 MINN. L. REv.
536 (1949) (§1404(a) should apply to FELA special venue provisions).
United States v. National City Lines, 334 U. S. 573 (1948); Baltimore &
Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44 (1941).
' Pascarella v. New York Cent. R. R., 81 F. Supp. 95 (E. D. N. Y. 1948) (held
that §1404(a) was applicable only to actions brought under §§1391-1406 of Title
28 and not to actions under special venue statutes).
'United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 83 F. Supp. 233 (D. D. C.
1949) (antitrust suit); Brainard v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 81 F. Supp. 211
(N. D. Ill. 1948) (court accepted application of §1404(a) to a FELA suit, but
exercised its discretion to decide that the case should not be delayed by transfer
to another forum) ; Scott v. New York Cent. R. R., 81 F. Supp. 815 (N. D. Ill.
1948) (FELA suit); Nunn v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 80 F. Supp. 745
(S. D. N. Y. 1948) (FELA suit); United States v. National City Lines, 80 F.
Supp. 734 (S. D. Cal. 1948) (antitrust suit); White v. Thompson, 80 F. Supp.
411 (N. D. Ill. 1948) (FELA suit); Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 79 F.
Supp. 821 (D. Minn. 1948) (FELA suit).
Ex parte Collett, 69 Sup. Ct. 944 (1949) ; Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 69
Sup. Ct. 953 (1949).
'United States v. National City Lines, 69 Sup. Ct. 955 (1949).
"0 7 to 2 decisions, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting in all three cases.
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without hint that some should be excluded."'1 The majority also used
the legislative history of §1404(a) and the Reviser's Notes to show that
FELA actions were within the scope of the new power. 12 As to why
there was no reference in the Reviser's Notes to the court's decision
that the antitrust law special venue provisions created an absolute right,
the court pointed out that the Reviser's Notes were printed in 1947 and
the first ruling by the court on the absolute right of the antitrust venue
provisions was handed down on June 7, 1948.13 Further, it was held
that §1404(a) did not repeal the special venue provisions of the FELA14
as those provisions defined the proper forum and §1404(a) deals with
the right to transfer an action properly brought.15 Said the court, "An
action may still be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it
might have been brought previously."'1
The dissenting justices felt that to follow the holding of the major-
ity would work too drastic a change in too many statutes to be the
product of a mere revision of the code. E.g., the special venue pro-
visions of the Sherman Act, FELA, Suits in Admiralty Act, Jones Act,
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, Securities Act, Securities Exchange Act,
Public Utility Holding Company Act, Investment Company Act, and
perhaps other statutes too. Therefore, the dissent would make §1404(a)
applicable only to any civil action as to which venue provisions are codi-
fied in revised Title 28.'7
Three cases dealing with only two special venue situations may not
be grounds for a final answer to the problem, but from the rationale of
these decisions it would seem that the new transfer provisions would
apply to all special venue statutes. Thus, while an action can still be
brought as it might have been brought previously, the power given in
§1404(a) may be used to transfer the action to another district or
division whether the venue is prescribed by general or special venue
provisions.
JOHN M. Simms.
"Ex parte Collett, 69 Sup. Ct. 944, 946 (1949).121d. at 947-952. In the Reviser's Notes to §1404(a), the.Kepner case, vipra
note 5, was cited as an example of the need for such a provision.
" United States v. National City Lines, 334 U. S. 573 (1948).
The concurring opinion of the late Justice Rutledge, 69 Sup. Ct. 959 (1949),
expressed his doubts as to congressional knowledge of the effect of §1404(a) on
antitrust suits, but notwithstanding his doubts that Congress intended to go so
far as the majority held, he acquiesced in the court's decision.
" 36 STAT. 291 §6 (1910), 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946).
"" "Section 1404(a) does not limit or otherwise modify any right granted in
§6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular district." E.
parte Collett, 69 Sup. Ct. 944, 947 (1949).8 Ex parte Collett. 69 Sup. Ct. 944, 947 (1949).
" United States v. National City Lines, 69 Sup. Ct. 955, 958 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Criminal Law-Infamous Offenses.-Attempted Burglary
Punishable as a Felony
"All misdemeanors," says the North Carolina Statute,' "where a
specific punishment is not prescribed shall be punished as misdemeanors
at common law; but if the offense be infamous, or done in secrecy and
malice, or with deceit and intent to defraud, the offender shall, except
where the offense is a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor, be guilty
of a felony and punished by imprisonment in the county jail or state
prison for not less than four months nor more than ten years, or shall
be fined." In State v. Surles,2 with one justice dissenting, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, construing this statute, held an attempt to
commit burglary infamous, and therefore a felony; thus affirming the
sentence of the trial judge that defendant be imprisoned in the State's
Prison for a term of ten years. Had the Court held the offense a mis-
demeanor, to be punished as at common law, the maximum penalty would
have been a fine, or imprisonment in the county jail, or both. Imprison-
ment in such case could not exceed two years.3
The offense of attempt to commit burglary has never been the sub-
ject of legislation in North Carolina,4 but in State v. Jordan5 our Court
held it to be a common law misdemeanor.6  At the time of this decision
the above statute covered only offenses made misdemeanors by statute,
and therefore the question of infamy was not raised therein.7
The real difficulty in applying the above statute lies in the want of
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-3 (1943).
"230 N. C. 272, 52 S. E. 2d 880 (1949).
B State v. Wilson, 216 N. C. 130, 45 S. E. 2d 440 (1939) ; "Recurring to the
many decisions imposing sentence for misdemeanors, we find none where a sentence
of more than two years has been approved." State v. Tyson, 223 N. C. 492, 494,
27 S. E. 2d 113, 115 (1943).
For a general discussion of North Carolina's penal policy see, Coates, Punish-
ient of Crime in North Carolia, 17 N. C. L. Ray. 205 (1939).
' Certain attempts have by statute been made felonies: "Attempted arson," N. C.
GEN. STAT. §14-67 (1943); "Attempted train robbery," N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-89(1943): "Attempted carnal knowledge of married woman," N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-
24 (1943).
'75 N. C. 27 (1876); but see State v. Harris, 120 N. C. 577, 579. 26 S. E.
774, 775 (1897) where the Court said: "Attempts to commit any of the four capital
offenses were formerly felonies, but during the prosecution for 'Kuklux' troubles
the offense of assault with intent to commit murder was reduced to a simple
misdemeanor." The Court seems to infer that an attempt to commit burglary,
one of the four capital offenses, has always been a felony.
'"All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use
within this state, or so much of the common law as is not destructive of, or re-
pugnant to, or inconsistent with the freedom and independence of this state and
the form of government therein established, and which has not been otherwise pro-
vided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are
hereby declared to be in full force within this state." N. C. GEN. STAT. §4-1
(1943).
" In 1905, the statute was partially rewritten so as to cover "all misdemeanors,"
without regard to whether they arose at common law or were created by legis-
lative fiat. N. C. Ray. STAT. §3293 (1905).
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a rule by which infamous crimes may be designated with definiteness.
Two different tests have, in the past, been employed in determining this
question, and, as might be expected, have led to conflict in the decisions
as to what crimes are infamous. Under the earlier decisions,8 both in
England and this country, the courts inclined to the doctrine that it is
the nature of the crime, and not the character of the punishment, which
renders it infamous. But it is now well settled that the test to be applied
by federal courts, in determining whether an offense is an infamous
crime, is the character of the punishment which may be inflicted.9 The
North Carolina Court' ° and other state courts" have also adopted the
"character of the penalty" test, holding an infamous crime to be one
which subjects the offender to an infamous punishment. However, this
test is inoperative as a key to the meaning of the term as used in the
above statute, for the statute specifically applies only to those misde-
meanors for which no punishment is prescribed.
The federal doctrine and the doctrine heretofore applied in this
State being inapplicable, apparently the Court attempted to apply the
common law test, namely, the nature of the crime. This is evidenced
by the fact that the opinion stated that "infamous," as used in the statute
"necessarily refers to the degrading nature of the offense, and not to the
measure of punishment then being set down.' 2
At common law, the term infamous was applied to crimes disqualify-
ing convicts as witnesses and causing the suppression of their political
rights.' 3 They were enumerated as treason, felony, and the crimen
falsi.'4 The latter term would seem to cover "infamous misdemeanors,"
as used in the above statute. In the Roman Law, from which the term
was borrowed, crimen falsi is used to describe that class of crimes which
involve falsification, that is to say, forgery, false declarations or false
oaths such as perjury.' 5 Such an element is not present in an attempt
8 Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 111 At1. 861 (1920);
People v. Sponsler, 1 Dak. 289, 46 N. W. 459 (1876); State v. Vashon, 123 Me.
412, 123 Atl. 511 (1924).
'Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 5 Sup. Ct. 935, 29 L. Ed. 89 (1885); "It
is not the character of the crime but the nature of the punishment which renders
the crime infamous." Weeks v. U. S., 216 Fed. 292, 298 (2d Cir. 1914).
" Gudger v. Penland, 108 N. C. 593, 13 S. E. 168 (1891).
"' "Whether a crime is infamous or not is to be determined by the nature of
the punishment inflicted." Perry v. Bingham, 265 Ky. 133, 137, 95 S. W. 2d 1099,
1101 (1936) ; O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N. W. 550 (1936).
12 State v. Surles, 230 N. C. 272, 276, 52 S. E. 2d 880, 883 (1949).
" U. S. v. Barefield, 23 Fed. 136, 137 (E. D. Texas 1885) ; UNDERHILL, CRIM-
INAL EVIDENCE 332 (3rd ed. 1923); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw 41 (11th ed.
1912) ; CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES 10 (4th ed. 1940).
1, U. S. v. Sims, 161 Fed. 1008, 1012 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1907). Drazen v.
New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 111 AtI. 861, 862 (1920).
""Infamous crimes are every species of the crimen falsi, such as forgery,
perjury, subornation of perjury, and offenses affecting the public administration
of justice." Wick v. Baldwin, 51 Ohio St. 51, 56, 36 N. E. 671, 672 (1894);
State v. Clark, 60 Kan. 450, 56 Pac. 767 (1889) ; I GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 373(13th ed. 1876) ; 1 BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd rev. ed. 1914) 730.
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to commit burglary. Neither is it present in an attempt to com-
mit buqgery; nevertheless, that was held to be an infamous mis-
demeanor in State v. Spivey,16 the Court construing the same statute.
In neither the Surles case nor the Spivey case did the Court advance
any criteria by which one might determine other infamous crimes. In
the Surles case, the majority of the Court, through Chief justice Stacy,
said that an attempt to commit burglary is "an act of depravity, which
involves moral turpitude, reveals a heart devoid of social duties and a
mind fatally bent on mischief," and therefore infamous. If this was
intended to be a definition of the term infamous, it seems the Court has
given birth to a new meaning of the term. This is especially true in
view of State v. Tyson' 7 where, in remanding a judgment, rendered
under this same statute, that defendant be confined for not less than
eight nor more than ten years, following a plea of guilty to assault upon
a female, it was said: "while his Honor found that the assault was
aggravated, shocking, and outrageous to the sensibilities and decencies
of right-thinking citizens, the Court did not find the offense to be
infamous."
In order to further strengthen its decision, the Court pointed out
that not only is the crime of burglary a felony,'" but that the mere
preparation to commit burglary is likewise made a felony by statute.19
"In between mere preparation and actual commission lies the crime of
attempt, which, if not a felony," said the Court, "undoubtedly arises
from an artless omission in the statutes. '20 It is submitted, by the writer,
that such is not necessarily an artless omission. The gravamen of the
offense of preparation to commit burglary is the possession of burglar's
tools without lawful excuse2 ' which seems to indicate that the statute
was designed to enable law enforcing officers to apprehend the profes-
sional burglar before the consummation of any crime. Even, if it be
conceded that there would be a discrepancy in the statutes if an attempt
to commit burglary was not a felony, it is submitted that the discrep-
ancy still exists since the maximum penalty possible for an attempt
to commit burglary is ten years while a sentence of twenty-five to thirty
years has been upheld under the statute against preparation.2 2 Besides,
it would seem that the duty to correct any such inconsistency, if such
exists, lies with the legislature and not the judiciary.
CHARLES E. KNOX.
1- 213 N. C. 45, 195 S. E. 1 (1937).
'223 N. C. 492, 493, 27 S. E. 2d 113, 114 (1943).
118 . C. GEN. STAT. §14-1 (1943).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §14-55 (1943).
20 State v. Surles, 230 N. C. 272, 277, 52 S. E. 2d 880, 883 (1949).
- State v. Vicks, 213 N. C. 235, 195 S. E. 779 (1938).22 State v. Cain, 209 N. C. 275, 183, S. E. 200 (1936).
1949]
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Damages-Wrongful Death-Evidence of Improvident
Attitude of Decedent
Garfield Hanks was convicted of non-support and ordered to pay
$10 per week for support of his children. Later Hanks filed a com-
plaint for absolute divorce, alleging an agreement respecting custody and
support of the three minor children. The next day, and before service
of this summons and complaint, Hanks was killed when struck by the
defendant's train at a crossing. His wife as administratrix successfully
brought an action for wrongful death, and put in evidence the gross earn-
ings of deceased for the past several years and his average weekly wage
at the time of his death. The defendant excepted to exclusion of the
non-support judgment and the summons and complaint for divorce, as
well as to exclusion of its offer of the inventory of Hanks' estate. On
the appeal, by a 4-3 decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that exclusion of the evidence was error.1
There are two main theories in general use for determining the
amount of recovery in a wrongful death action :2 (1) loss to surviving
relatives, or the amount of money and services these relatives would
have received had the deceased lived out his life expectancy, and (2) loss
to the estate, which, depending upon the jurisdiction, is (a) present
worth of probable gross earnings less personal expenses had death not
occurred, (b) present worth of probable savings of deceased had death
not occurred, or (c) gross earnings during the life expectancy which
was cut short.
The North Carolina statutes provide for an action for wrongful
death, in which a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury
may be awarded and disposed of in the manner of personal property
in case of intestacy.3 The statutes do not detail the manner in which
this pecuniary injury shall be measured, but leave this question to judicial
determination. As to this measure of damages, North Carolina can be
placed in category (2) (a), namely, the present worth of probable gross
earnings less personal expenses had death not occurred.4
1 Hanks v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 230 N. C. 179, 52 S. E. 2d 717 (1949).
2 McCORMICK, DAMAGES §95 (1935).
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-174 (1943) : "The plaintiff in such action may recover
such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury re-
sulting from such a death." N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943): ". . . The amount
recovered in such action is not liable to be applied as assets, in the payment of
debts or legacies, except as to burial expenses of the deceased, but shall be dis-
posed of as provided in this chapter for the distribution of personal property in
case of intestacy."
'Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N. C. 379, 38 S. E. 2d 194 (1946); White v. N. C.
R. R., 216 N. C. 79, 3 S. E. 2d 310 (1939) ; Gurley v. Southern Power Co., 172
N. C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916); Mendenhall v. N. C. R. R., 123 N. C. 275, 31
S. E. 480 (1898) ("The measure of damages is the present value of the net
pecuniary worth of the deceased to be ascertained by deducting the cost of his
own living and expenditures from the gross income, based upon his life ex-
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North Carolina decisions have made it perfectly clear that there is a
marked distinction between the North Carolina statute based on present
worth of the net pecuniary value of the life of the deceased, and statutes
of other jurisdictions, including the Federal Employer's Liability Act,
based on the pecuniary loss sustained by the beneficiaries ;5 that the num-
ber and age of children dependent upon deceased is inadmissible on the
damage issue in a wrongful death action ;O that whether or not deceased
would have accumulated anything should not be considered ;7 that the
cause of action did not belong to the deceased, and that those entitled
to receive damages do not claim through him ;8 and that the personal
expenses of deceased which are to be deducted from gross earnings to
arrive at expected net income do not include contributions to the sup-
port of his family or dependents." These decisions indicate that North
Carolina has confined the question of damages in a wrongful death action
to finding out (1) how much money decedent would have made if he
had lived, and (2) how much of this he would have spent on himself
alone, independently of family expense. After this is done, the personal
expenses are subtracted from gross income. The present worth of this
sum is then the dollar and cents amount recovered.' 0 According to the
majority opinion, the abandonment and non-support order, the complaint
for divorce with custody agreement, and the inventory of the decedent's
estate were offered in evidence "to show the character of the deceased
and his disinclination to provide for dependent members of his family."
A number of North Carolina decisions contain statements that character
evidence is admissible in a wrongful death action." These opinions do
pectancy.") ; Benton v. N. C. R. R., 122 N. C. 1007, 30 S. E. 333 (1898) ("The
measure of damages for loss of life of plaintiff's intestate is the present value of
his net income, and this is to be ascertained by deducting the cost of living and
expenditure from his net gross income and then estimating the present value of
the accumulation from such net income, based upon his expectation in life.").G Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N. C. 130, 131 S. E. 400
(1925) ; Horton v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 175 N. C. 472, 95 S. E. 883 (1918).
Bradley v. Ohio R. & C. R. R., 122 N. C. 972, 30 S. E. 8 (1898).7 Roberson v. Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co., 154 N. C. 328, 70 S. E. 630(1911)..
' Hood v. American T. & T. Co., 162 N. C. 92, 77 S. E. 1094 (1913).
"Rigsbee v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 190 N. C. 231, 129 S. E. 580 (1925).
"0 "Under the state law, the damages for the pecuniary worth of the deceased
are to be ascertained by deducting the probable cost of his own living and usual
or ordinary expenses from the probable gross income derived from his own ex-
ertions based upon his life expectancy (Purnell v. Railroad, 190 N. C. 573, 130
S. E. 313). And, in ascertaining these damages, the jury is at liberty to take
into consideration the age, health, and expectancy- of life of the deceased, his
earning capacity, his habits, his ability and skill, the business in which he was
employed, and the means he had for making money-the end of it all being to
enable the jury fairly to determine the net income which the deceased might
reasonably have been expected to earn, had his death not ensued." Carpenter v.
Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N. C. 130, 131 S. E. 400 (1925). "If a man's
net earnings are but $100 per annum, that is his pecuniary value to his family,
whether large [family] or small." Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154 (1872).
Hancock v. Wilson, 211 N. C. 129, 189 S. E. 631 (1936); Poe v. Raleigh
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not deal with whether or not character evidence is admissible generally,
or for a specific purpose, but in at least one case it is stated that evi-
dence of the character of the deceased was relevant only on the question
of his earning capacity.' 2 The dissent in the principal case states that
any evidence not excluded by a specific rule of law and having a logical
tendency to show either probable gross income of deceased or probable
costs of deceased's own living and personal expenses should be admitted.
The view of the dissent would seem to be correct, as evidence of char-
acter or otherwise which tended to show probable earnings or spendings
of the deceased would bear upon the question of expected net income
of the deceased. It is submitted, however, that unless character evi-
dence does tend to show either probable earnings or personal expendi-
tures of the deceased, it is irrelevant on the issue of damages in a
wrongful death action in North Carolina.
The majority opinion would admit the evidence to show the character
of the deceased because it tended to show a lack of a provident attitude
by the deceased toward his family. Following this viewpoint, the court
seems to be adopting a loss to the beneficiaries theory, for it is self-
evident that a family whose husband and father had been quite generous
in providing for their needs and desires has lost by his death more from
a financial standpoint than a family whose husband and father was nig-
gardly in his support. But if those designated by statute to receive the
recovery receive an amount dependent only upon the father's probable
earnings and personal expenditures, provident attitude or lack of one
would be immaterial.
A great deal of the language used in a number of earlier North
Carolina decisions on the measure of damages in wrongful death actions
would seem to indicate that the measure of damages in North Carolina is
the pecuniary advantage which might be expected from continuance of
deceased's life by the family,13 or pecuniary worth to the family. 14 The
first of these, the case of Kesler v. Smith,15 was decided in 1872 and
the opinion in the case states that the statute under which the action
was brought provided that the amount recovered in a wrongful death
action should be for the exclusive and sole benefit of the widow and
issue of the deceased' 6 in all cases where they are surviving. Conse-
& Augusta A. L. R. R., 141 N. C. 525, 54 S. E. 406 (1906); Mendenhall v. N. C.
R. R., 123 N. C. 275, 31 S. E. 480 (1898).
12 Speight v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 161 N. C. 81, 76 S. E. 684 (1912).
" Burton v. Wilmington & W. R. PL, 82 N. C. 505 (1880).
14 Burns v. Asheboro & M. R. R., 125 N. C. 304, 34 S. E. 495 (1899) ; Menden-
hall v. N. C. R. R., 123 N. C. 275, 31 S. E. 980 (1898); Kesler v. Smith, 66
N. C. 154 (1872).11; 66 N. C. 154 (1872).
"
8 Actually, though this wording was enacted in 1855, N. C. Pub. Laws 1868-69,
c. 113, §72 had changed this provision to read that recovery would be disposed
of as provided for personal property in case of intestacy.
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quently the term, "injury to the family" was used in that case, and later
cases merely repeated it. Later cases seem to omit the phrase "to the
family," and in a more recent case' 7 it is stated that the recovery for
the value of a child's life is not what his services might have been worth
to someone else during his minority, but what his entire life would have
been worth to himself if he had lived. In Queen City Coach Co. v.
Lee' s8 the judge's charge was "pecuniary worth (of deceased) to his
estate," and this was held to be in accordance with North Carolina
authorities. If there is no family or next of kin to take the recovery,
the University of North Carolina is entitled to the recovery' 9 indicating
clearly that the recovery does not depend on loss to the family of the
decedent.
Evidence of the provident attitude of the deceased was admited in
one case20 when offered by the plaintiff, but it was considered that the
evidence of deceased's having been a good provider for his family
showed a constant attention to his business, and thus was admitted to
show earning capacity. In the principal case, the non-support order,
the divorce complaint, and the inventory do tend to show lack of a
provident attitude by deceased, but tend very remotely, if at all, to show
earning capacity or decedent's own living expenses. When the evi-
dence on non-support, however, is coupled with the inventory of
decedent's estate there is an indication of the decedent's personal ex-
penditures, and on this ground these two offers could be relevant, for
if a man has given his family a small amount of his wages and his estate
shows almost nothing, then a high degree of probability exists that per-
sonal expenditures were high. But as pointed out by the dissent, there
was nothing in the record to show that deceased's contributions to his
family were controlled by the support order. Accordingly this com-
bination of evidence has little probative value.
Inasmuch as the majority opinion would permit the excluded evi-
dence to come in to show lack of provident attitude, this case seems
to be out of line with the other North Carolina cases holding to a strict
net-income theory and rejecting the loss to beneficiaries theory.
BASIL SHERRILL.
Domestic Relations-Actions-Wife's Tort Liability to Husband
In Scholtens v. Scholtens,' plaintiff husband brought an action against
his wife to recover damages for personal injuries which he received in
an automobile accident allegedly caused by her negligence. Thus the
"Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N. C. 961, 36 S. E. 191 (1900).
"8218 N. C. 320, 11 S. E. 2d 341 (1940).
1" Warner v. Western N. C. R. R., 94 N. C. 250 (1886).
" Hicks v. Love, 201 N. C. 773, 161 S. E. 395 (1931).
1230 N. C. 149, 52 S. E. 2d 350 (1949).
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question of whether a husband may maintain an action against his wife
for a personal tort committed during coverture was presented for the
first time in this state. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the husband had no right to maintain such an action.
It is well known that at common law the husband and wife became
one by marriage. 2 The legal existence of the wife was suspended dur-
ing coverture and incorporated into that of her husband, she being
unable to sue or be sued without his joinder. As one could not sue
himself, neither spouse could sue the other. The majority of states still
recognize the common law disability of husband and wife to maintain
personal tort actions inter se,3 the reasons advanced being similar in
most jurisdictions denying liability. One reason is that the various
Married Women's Acts, some of which purport to allow the wife to
sue and be sued as if she were single, are said to be in derogation of
the common law and thus to be strictly construed. Suits between hus-
band and wife are declared to be against public policy in that they tend
to break up the family unit. It is also reasoned that husband and wife
have an adequate remedy in the criminal and divorce laws.
• In 1868 the common law disability of a wife to sue was partially
removed in North Carolina by a statute allowing her to sue without her
husband's joinder under certain circumstances. 4 This was held to mean
that a wife might sue her husband when the action concerned her
separate property.5 In 1913 another statute further enlarged married
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (1910) ; Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32,
103 Pac. 219 (1909); Aldrich v. Tracy, 221 Iowa 84, 269 N. W. 30 (1936);
Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N. W. 624 (1920); Austin v. Austin, 136
Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Butterfield v. Butterfield, 195 Mo. App. 37, 187
S. W. 295 (1916) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923).8 Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 2; Ewald v. Lane, 104 F. 2d 222 (D. C.
Cir. 1939) ; Cubbison v. Cubbison, 73 Cal. App. 2d 437, 166 P. 2d 387 (1946) ;
Carmichael v. Cirmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S. E. 116 (1936); Broaddus v.
Wilkenson, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S. W. 2d 1052 (1940); Harvey v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co., 6 So. 2d 774 (La. Ct. of App. 1942); Anthony v. Anthony, 135
Me. 54, 188 A. 724 (1937); Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N. E. 2d 637
(1948) ; Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N. W. 120 (1939) ; Keralis v.
Keralis, 213 Minn. 31, 4 N. W. 2d 632 (1942) ; Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439,
151 So. 551 (1934); Mullally v. Langenberg Bros. Grain Co., 339 Mo. 582, 98
S. W. 2d 645 (1936); Lang v. Lang, 24 N. J. Misc. 26, 45 A. 2d 822 (1946);
Tanno v. Elby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N. E. 2d 813 (1946); Fisher v. Diehl, 156
Pa. Super. Ct. 476, 40 A. 2d 912 (1945) ; Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S. W. 2d 445 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938) ; Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 A. 903 (1934) ; Staats
v. Co-operative Transit Co., 125 W. Va. 473, 24 S. E. 2d 916 (1943) ; McKinney
v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P. 2d 940 (1943).
'N. C. CONSOL. STAT. §454 (1941) : "When a married woman is a party, her
husband must be joined with her, except that-1. When the action concerns her
separate property, she may sue alone. 2. When the action is between herself and
her husband, she may sue or be sued alone. In no case need she prosecute or
defend by a guardian or next friend." This statute was deleted in the codification
of the North Carolina General Statutes of 1943 as having been superseded by
Chapter 52 entitled Married Women.
'Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 75 S. E. 998 (1912) ; Perkins v. Brinkley,
133 N. C. 154, 45 S. E. 536 (1903); Robinson v. Robinson, 123 N. C. 136, 31
S. E. 371 (1898); McCormac v. Wiggins, 84 N. C. 278 (1881); Manning v.
Manning, 79 N. C. 293 (1878); Shuler v. Millsaps, 71 N. C. 297 (1874).
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women's rights to sue in tort.6 Under these two statutes a wife was
allowed recovery against her husband for a willful assault.7  In 1923
the North Carolina Supreme Court held for the first time in the United
States that a wife might sue her husband in tort for negligent injury.8
Now it is well settled in North Carolina that such an action will lie.9
In North Carolina the husband has been allowed to sue the wife for
negligent tort where the cause of action arose prior to their marriage,
since by statute the subsequent marriage cannot affect her antenuptial
liability.' 0 In that case the court referred to, but expressly refused to
decide, the question presented in the Scholtens case. In the Scholtens
case the court reasoned that, since there is no statutory authorization
for the husband to sue his wife for personal injury inflicted during
coverture, the husband had only his common law rights against the
wife. The decision is based to some extent upon the fact that the
statute of 1868 was deleted in the adoption of the General Statutes of
1943.11 Since this statute of 1868 specifically enabled a married woman
to sue or be sued alone when the action was between herself and her
husband, it thus implied that the husband could indeed sue the wife.
There is some doubt as to whether the result of the Scholtens case
would have been the same had this statute not been deleted.
The question presented by the principal case has been decided on
similar facts in two other jurisdictions, Wisconsin and West Virginia.
The Wisconsin statute purports to allow a married woman to bring an
action in her own name for any personal injury as if she were sole.'2
Under this statute it was held that a wife might sue her husband for
personal injuries caused by his negligence. 13  The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin recognized that by statute the wife's rights were superior to
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §52-10 (1943): "The earnings of a married woman by
virtue of any contract for her personal service, and any damages for personal
injuries, or other tort sustained by her, can be recovered by her suing alone, and
such earnings or recovery shall be her sole and separate property as fully as if
she had remained unmarried."
"Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920), rehearing denied,
181 N. C. 66, 106 S. E. 149 (1921) (husband infected his wife with a venereal
disease).
I Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923) (negligent automobile
accident). See also Roberts v. Guaranty Co., 188 N. C. 795, 125 S. E. 611 (1924)
(husband held entitled to recover on his indemnity policy the amount of his wife's
judgment against him in Roberts v. Roberts, supra; questions of public policy and
sound morals were addressed to the Legislature).
' Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N. C. 51, 12 S. E. 2d 649 (1940) ; Alberts v. Alberts,
217 N. C. 443, 8 S. E. 2d 523 (1940) ; York v. York, 212 N. C. 695, 194 S. E.
486 (1937) ; Earle v. Earle, 198 N. C. 411, 151 S. E. 884 (1930).
10 Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N. C. 51, 158 S. E. 840 (1931).
'- N. C. CoNsoL. STAT. §454 (1941). See note 4 supra.
"
2Wis. STAT. §246.07 (1947) (".... And any married woman may bring and
maintain an action in her own name for any injury to her person or character the
same as if she were sole....").
" Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475 (1926).
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those of her husband 14 and, when the question of the principal case was
presented, held that the husband had only his common law rights against
his wife.' 5 As a result of this decision the Wisconsin Legislature passed
a statute giving the husband the right to maintain an action against his
wife "for recovery of damages for injuries sustained to his person caused
by her wrongful act, neglect or default."'1  In West Virginia, where
the statute provided that a married woman might sue or be sued as if
she were single,'- the decision was also against the husband. The Court
reasoned that the only effect of the statute was to make it possible for
a married woman to sue or be sued by third persons without her hus-
band's joinder, not to authorize the husband to sue the wife.' 8
There are certain practical considerations which may have influenced
the Court's decision in the Scholtens case. In most tort actions between
husband and wife, especially the automobile accident cases, the real de-
fendant is an insurance company. The danger of collusion between the
insured and the person injured, present in liability insurance cases, is
considerably increased by the relationship of the parties. Hence the
Court may not have wished to further extend liability. This element
of collusion, however, has not hampered the wife's cause of action against
her husband, and there is certainly no more danger of collusion when
the husband sues the wife. Also the conventional public policy argu-
ment that such actions split the family is not applicable in the insurance
cases, since neither spouse is in fact paying the bill.
It is submitted that the result of the Scholtens case is illogical and
that had the Court so desired, it had legitimate grounds for allowing the
suit. That North Carolina has been liberal in this field heretofore is
well illustrated by the fact that it was the first state to recognize the
wife's cause of action against the husband for negligent tort.19 Judging
by the majority opinion of Chief Justice Clark in Crowell v. Crowell,20
it seems that he would have no trouble reaching a different result in the
principal case. He recognized that we have by statute adopted the com-
mon law except as it has been "abrogated, repealed or become obso-
" See Singer v. Singer, 245 Wis. 191, 197, 14 N. W. 2d 43, 47 (1944).
"Fehr v. General Accident Fire & Life Insur. Corp., Ltd., 246 Wis. 228, 16
N. W. 2d 787 (1944).
" Wis. STAT. §246.075 (1947): "A husband shall have and may maintain an
action against his wife for the recovery of damages for injuries sustained to his
person caused by her wrongful act, neglect or default." New York also changed
its common law rule by a statute enabling husband and wife to sue each other for
personal tort (N. Y. Domt. REL. LAW §57) under which it was held that a, hus-
band might sue his wife for malicious prosecution of a divorce action. Weidlich
v. Weidlich, 177 Misc. 246, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 326 (1941).
" W. VA. CoDE ANN. §4749 (1943).
S Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 604 (1935) ; accord, Staats v.
Co-operative Transit Co., 125 W. Va. 473, 24 S. E. 2d 916 (1943).
"Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923).
-' 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920), rehearing denied, 181 N. C. 66, 106
S. E. 149 (1921).
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lete."21 In view of the wife's rights against her husband at the present
time in North Carolina, it seems that these common law principles as to
the husband's rights against his wife are clearly antiquated. Our Court
has said that the legislature in passing the Married Women's Act in-
tended to equalize the legal status of husband and wife.2 2 If applying the
common law as to the husband's rights gives the wife rights superior
to those of her husband, the common law in this respect is obsolete and
should not be the law. Further our court has long recognized that the
common law unity of husband and wife no longer exists, having been
changed by statute.23  Since the wife by statute is no longer a part of
the unit, but is separate enough even to sue her husband for personal
tort, it is a mere fiction to say they are one for purposes of the husband's
suit against his wife.
Since the court clearly indicated in the principal case that legislative
action will be necessary to change the rule enunciated, it is urged that
the Legislature of North Carolina enact a statute specifically enabling
the husband to sue his wife for personal injuries caused by 'her during
coverture.
MASON P. THOMAS, JR.
Domestic Relations-Child's Interest in the Parental Relation-
Suit by Infant for Enticement of Mother
The authorities are recent and in conflict on the question of whether
a minor child has a cause of action against an outsider for damages
suffered as a result of the outsider's enticement of the child's parent
from the family home.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has no decision on this ques-
tion. It is, however, in accord with the view that damage to relational
interests' is the true basis of similar actions of alienation of affections2
N . C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1943). Italics added.
- Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 825, 32 S. E. 2d 611, 614(1944) "The effect of the legislation on the subject is to equalize the legal status
of husband and wife. . . . But if the legislative intent of equality is to prevail,
the same cause of action which is denied to the wife may not be retained or pre-
served to the husband"; Hipp v. Dupont, 182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318 (1921).
"2 Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 569, 118 S. E. 9, 11 (1923) "The unity
of person in the strict common-law sense no longer exists in this jurisdiction, be-
cause many of the common law disabilities have been removed. This change
relates to remedies as well as rights."
1 Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rzv. 461, 462 (1934). "Relational
interests are distinct interests. They extend beyond the personality, and are not
symbolized by any tangible thing which can legitimately be called property...
The situation is this: the plaintiff stands in relation to some other person; defend-
ant hurts plaintiff's relation with that person. This is a hurt done to a relational
interest."
- Chestnutt v. Sutton, 207 N. C. 256, 176 S. E. 743 (1934) ; Cottle v. Johnson.
179 N. C. 426, 102 S. E. 759 (1920) (holding that the gravamen of the cause of
action for alienation of affections of the plaintiff's wife is the deprivation of the
plaintiff of his conjugal rights to the society, affection, and assistance of his wife).
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and abduction and seduction of a minor child.3 It has recognized that
a child has protectible rights in the parent-child relationship in allowing
the child to sue its parent directly for support.4
The first suit reaching an appellate court for an outsider's entice-
ment of the mother from the home5 was brought on the theory that the
wrongful interference with the family unit gave the injured member a
right of action. The cause of action was disallowed for the reasons that
the crux of an action for alienation of affections was injury to con-
sortium6 given only by the contract of marriage, that to uphold the
cause would give a right of action to every family member resulting in
a "flood of litigation," and in duplicated damages since the number and
ages of the children are considered in awarding damages in the father's
suit for alienation of his wife's affections.7
The first recognition of the cause of action was where the father
was etiticed from the home and the child was allowed to recover for the
resulting loss of parental support and maintenance, "as well as other
damages for the destruction of other rights which arise out of the
family relationship ... ."8
It was emphasized that the basis of the cause of action was the rela-
tional interests rather than support when it was allowed although the
enticed father was already furnishing support under a court order.0
The concept of the family as a legal unit with correlative rights and
duties1° entitling the child to the affection, moral support, and guidance
of both parents, justified an action against an outsider who stopped
these benefits by inducing the parent to leave the home.
More recently the cause of action for loss of these benefits has been
'Little v. Holmes, 181 N. C. 413, 107 S. E. 577 (1921); Howell v. Howell,
162 N. C. 283, 78 S. E. 22 (1913) ("The real ground of action is compensation
for the expense and injury and 'punitive damages for the wrong done him in his
affections and the destruction of his household,' [cases cited]."). For an historical
account of the basis of this action from the feudal incident of marriage to parent's
right to child's services see Note, 13 Am. DEc. 715 (1879).
'Pickelsimer v. Critcher, 210 N. C. 779, 188 S. E. 313 (1936); Green v.
Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936), 15 N. C. L. REv. 67 (1937).
' The issue of whether an adult son could recover against another member of
the family for interference with his mother's affections was presented collaterally
in Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 P. 400 (1923) and in Cole v. Cole, 277
Mass. 50, 177 N. E. 810 (1931). Opinion on the issue was withheld and dis-
missals in both cases were sustained on other grounds.
The right of the husband and wife respectively to the conjugal fellowship,
company, cooperation and aid of the other. BOUVIER, LAw DICTIONARY 621
(Rawle's 3d ed. 1914).
"Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct.
1934).
8Daily v. Parker, 152 F. 2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). This decision provoked
national comment. E.g., Notes, 46 COL. L. Ray. 464 (1946), 32 CORN. L. Q. 432
(1947), 59 HARv. L. REV. 297 (1946), 30 MINN. L. REv. 310 (1946), 19 So. CAL.
L. REV. 455 (1946).
'Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E. 2d 810 (1947).
"Old. at 605, 71 N. E. 2d at 813.
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denied for reasons of policy,"- prohibitive statute,12 and lack of a prior
legal provision to support the cause.1
The decision in the recent case of Miller v. Monsen 4 establishes the
wrongful interference with a beneficial* relationship as the true basis of
this cause of action. In that case the plaintiff, a minor child, sued by
her guardian ad litem to recover damages allegedly sustained as a result
of defendant's enticing her mother from the family home. Prior to
the date of the mother's departure plaintiff lived with her father, mother,
brother, and sister as a family, receiving the mother's love, affection,
care, and services. As a result of defendant's enticement the then ex-
isting relationship between the plaintiff and her mother was destroyed,
causing her the loss of those benefits flowing from that relationship.
Verdict was for the plaintiff and on appeal by the defendant the court
held that a child has .legally protected rights in the maintenance of the
family relationship against interference by outsiders, and enticement by
an outsider of the parent from the family home constitutes an invasion
of the child's rights for which it may maintain an action for damages.
An evaluation of the soundness and desirability of recognizing this
cause of action allowing a child to recover damages for loss of parental
guidance, companionship, care and counsel necessitates consideration of
its legal basis and its material effects on society.
The doctrinal objections to this cause of action have come from the
common law concept of the family unit-wherein all actions for the pro-
tection of the family belonged to the father.' 5 The concept of the mod-
ern family as "a cooperative enterprise with correlative rights and duties
among all the members"' 6 seems more realistic.
It is obvious that a child has interests in the parental relationship.17
The child's interest in the pecuniary benefits have been recognized by
allowing it to enforce support by proceeding directly against the parent,' 8
to recover from a third person for injury to its means of support result-
ing from that person's sale of liquor to patent, or to another who injured
' McMillan v. Taylor, 160 F. 2d 221 (D. C. Cir. 1946) ; Taylor v. Keefe, 134
Conn. 156, 56 A. 2d 768 (1947).
12 Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 190 P. 2d 984 (1948) (statute listing
rights of personal relations was amended to omit prohibition of abduction of
parent from child).
"Garza v. Garza, 209 S. W. 2d 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
'- Minn. -, 37 N. W. 2d 543 (1949).
1 1 CooLFY, ToRTs 464 (3d ed. 1906).
'o See note 10 supra.
17 Pound, Indizidual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Micr. L. REv.
177, 185 (1916).8 Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936), 15 N. C. L. Rlv. 67(1937); cf. Paxton v. Paxton, 150 Cal. 667, 89 P. 1083 (1937) (duty imposed
by poor person's statute enforced in equity by adult child) ; Meyers v. Meyers,
169 Misc. 860, 8 N. Y. Supp. 2d 262 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (statute allowing child to
petition for enforcement of support).
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parent as result of intoxication,' and in some states to sue for the
wrongful death of the parent.20
The child's interests in the intangible benefits of the parental society,
affection, and comfort are similar to those protected in a spouse's action
for alienation of affections. The basis of that cause is consortium aris-
ing from the marriage contract. It does not follow that such interests
arise only from the marital relationship, or that they are protected only
by a consortium action.
The child has been allowed recovery of damages for violation of
intangible interests growing out of the parent-child relationship whose
benefits are less substantial than those of the instant cause of action. A
child, after it has reached maturity, has recovered damages for offenses
to his sensibilities through improper treatment of the dead body of his
parent,21 and for belated delivery of a death telegram preventing his
attending the parent's funeral.2 2 In actions for the wrongful death of a
parent the jury, in fixing damages, may consider the child's loss of
parental care, nurture, and moral education which it probably would have
received.23
Indeed, the modern view is that in closely analagous actions protec-
tion of the relationship is the true basis of the cause. Thus in a parent's
action for the abduction or seduction of a minor child, the fictional basis
of loss of services is eliminated. 24 And the effect of Married Women's
legislation,25 securing to the wife the right to her earnings and services,
"9 Horan v. Cooke Brewing Co., 178 Ill. App. 652 (1913); Taylor v. Carroll,
145 Mass. 95, 13 N. E. 348 (1887); Note, 14 NOTRE DAME LAW. 295 (1939).204 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWs §266 (1931).
21 Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N. J. Law 90, 186 A. 585 (1936);
Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N. Y. 249, 115 N. E. 715 (1917) ; Koerber
v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40 (1905); accord, Brownlee v. Pratt, 77 Ohio
App. 533, 68 N. E. 2d 798 (1948) (plaintiff recovered from defendant stepmother
who placed body of her second husband in vault constructed by plaintiff's father
for the bodies of the plaintiff, father, and mother); see Hamilton v. Individual
Mausoleum Co., 149 Kan. 216, 220, 86 P. 2d 501, 504 (1939); cf. Crenshaw v.
O'Connell, 235 Mo. App. 1085, 150 S. W. 2d' 489 (1941) (plaintiff recovered from
defendant coroner who performed illegal autopsy on body of plaintiff's husband).
22Medlin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 169 N. C. 495, 86 S. E. 366 (1915);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mang, 100 S. W. 2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mobley, 220 S. W. 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fulton, 211 S. W. 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ; cf. Russ
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N. C. 504, 23 S. E. 2d 681 (1943) (death of
plaintiff's brother). Contra: Vaigneur v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 92
(D. C. E. D. Tenn. 1940) (applying federal rule to interstate telegram) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Conway, 57 Ariz. 208, 112 P. 2d 857 (1941) (state court apply-
ing federal rule to interstate telegram) ; see Connell v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
116 Mo. 34, 22 S. W. 345 (1893) (death of plaintiff's child).23 See Note, 74 A. L. R. 11, 95 (1931).2
"See, e.g., Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N. E. 251 (1928); Tav-
linsky v. Ringling Bros. Circus, 113 Neb. 632, 204 N. W. 388 (1925) ; Pickle v.
Page, 252 N. Y. 474, 169 N. E. 650 (1930); Howell v. Howell, 162 N. C. 283,
78 S. E. 222 (1913); Idleman v. Groves, 89 W. Va. 91, 108 S. E. 485 (1921):
see Soper v. Igo, 121 Ky. 550, 553, 89 S. W. 538, 539 (1905).
23 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 22. §167.
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is that in a consortium action by either spouse the recovery is fQr in-
juries to the relationship. 26
Wrongful interference with a beneficial relationship as the basis of
the child's cause of action for the enticement of its parent has an
appealing simplicity and avoids the possible difficulties of consortium
and support.27 Giving legal protection on this basis does no violence
to similar domestic actions nor to the law of reasonable expectancy.
28
Those courts denying the cause of action admit their power to recog-
nize it but refuse to do so as a matter of policy and because of practical
objections2 9 These reasons range from the fear that upholding the
cause would open the courts to "a flood of litigation that would inundate
them" °30 to the feeling that the fewness of cases indicates the absence
of need for such relief.31
The validity of the objections is not settled,3 2 but their persistence
is evidence of a genuine concern beyond traditional caution of the
courts. This concern is rooted in the necessity of protecting society
from spurious litigation. It underlies the objections that recognizing
the validity of the cause would: (1) give a right of action to every mem-
ber of the family causing multiple suits; (2) result in duplicated dam-
ages since the age and number of children are considered in the father's
action for alienation of affections ;33 (3) result in extortionary litigation
because of the tenuousness of the relationship. Further objections are
that: (1) the court is unable to define at what point the child's right
"' Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 309 (1925);
3 N. C. L. Rav. 98 (1925) (by implication in refusing recovery for loss of hus-
band's services by negligent injury); Holcomb, The Change it the Meaning of
Consortium, 22 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1923); Lippman, The Breakdown of Con-
sortiun, 20 CoL. L. Rv. 651 (1930).
21 Johnston v. Johnston, 213 N. C. 255, 195 S. E. 807 (1938) held that loss of
support was a proper element of damages in wife's suit for the alienation of her
husband's affections. Should not the same rule apply in the child's action when
the legal duty of support is on the enticed parent?28See, e.g., Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (1926) (plain-
tiff had cause of action for defendant's acts depriving plaintiff of the society of
friends and neighbors); Schechter v. Friedman, 141 N. J. Eq. 318, 57 A. 2d 251(1948) (third person interferor held liable even though the contract might have
been unenforceable); Silva v. Bonafide Mills, Inc., - Misc. - , 182 N. Y.
Supp. 2d 155 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (plaintiff had cause of action for interference even
though the contract with the party induced to breach contained a cancellation
clause).
" See Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 158, 56 A. 2d 768, 769 (1948) ; Morrow
v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; cf. Rudley
v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 190 P. 2d 984, 987 (1948) ; see Garza v. Garza,
209 S. W. 2d 1012, 1015 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
" Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. Supp. 912, 913 (Sup. Ct.
1934).
"
1Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 145, 163, 56 A. 2d 768, 771 (1948).
"'Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E. 2d 810 (1947); Notes, 20
CORN. L. Q. 255 (1945), 13 U. OF CHr. L. RFv. 375 (1935).
"
2Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct.
1934).
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would cease ;34 (2) paucity of cases indicates the lack of need for such
relief; and (3) heart balm legislation 5 indicates that the present trend
is to disfavor such suits.3 6
To the favorite objection. that allowing the cause would produce a
flood of litigation, the court in the instant case gives a dual answer:
"Assuming it to be true ... that fact would be no valid reason for
denying the right ... if such enticement constitutes a legal wrong, there
should be a remedy to obtain redress. But the contention lacks factual
basis .... Sufficient time has elapsed since the decisions in the Daily
and Johnson cases (which allowed the cause) for a reasonable trial
period. There has been no flood of such litigation. This is true, for
the obvious reason that there are not enough such enticements to cause
even a burdensome increase of such litigation, much less a flood of it."
'8 7
The court eliminates objections not inherent in the cause itself with the
statement :
"We also deem the reason, sometimes given for denying liability .. .
that courts are incapable of defining the child's rights and that juries
are incapable of assessing its damages .. . to be without merit ...
Courts and juries are required to do precisely those things in certain
cases, and do so with complete success (cases cited). "13
Social policy favors protecting and fostering the family unit. It is
not to be supposed that this cause of action purports to give complete
protection by its deterring effect on future enticements. It is a step
toward that end to allow a cause of actiQn for loss of intangible but real
benefits which legal machinery is unable to secure in other ways.
In the last analysis the policy problem is one 6f balancing the inter-
ests of society against those of the individual member of the family.
Certainly the court which allows the child to recover for the injuries
from the destruction of its home and the.enticement of its parent has
likewise a grave responsibility to prevent abuse of the cause of action
by looking to the worthiness of the individual case, since the very pur-
pose of courts is "to separate the just from the unjust cause."3 9
RICHARD E. WARDLOW.
34Note, 83 U. oF PA. L. REV. 276 (1935).
" This legislation, begun in 1935 and adopted in. 12 states, generally forbids
actions for breach of promise of marriage, alienation of affections, criminal con-
versation, and seduction. It has been criticized as "flurry" legislation promoted
by newspaper sensationalism rather than by judicial need. Generally, see Heck
v. Schupp, 394 Ill. App. 296, 68 N. E. 2d 464 (1946): (declaring the Illinois statute
unconstitutional) ; KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1049 (3d ed. 1946) ; Feinsingcr,
Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MIcH. L. REv. 979 (1935) ; Kane, Heart
Balm and Public Policy, 5 FORD. L. REv. 63 (1936); Note, G. M. W., Twclvc
Years with the "Heart Balin Acts," 33 VA. L. Ray. 314 (1947).
"Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 158 A. 2d 768 (1948).
"T Miller v. Monsen, - Minn. - -, 37 N. W. 2d 543, 546 (1949).
"Ibid.
"Wilder v. Reno; 43 F. Supp, 727, 729 (M. D. Pa. .1942).
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Domestic Relations-Illegitimates--Father's Duty to Support
In the recent North Carolina case of Allen v. Hunnicutt1 it was held,
in effect, that an illegitimate child may not compel its father to furnish
it support by means of a civil action, but that only by the procedure
outlined in the "bastardy" statute2 may the child enforce "such rights
as it may have"3 against the putative father.
The direct question presented in Allen v. Hunnicutt has rarely con-
fronted the courts. In Alabama and Virginia it has been ruled that
without express statutory authorization an illegitimate may not main-
tain a civil suit for support against its putative father.4  But in Kansas
the common law rule which denies that the father has any duty to sup-
port his illegitimate child has been changed, the bastardy statute held
to provide an inadequate remedy, and a civil action by the child
permitted.5
The problem has often received the indirect consideration of the
courts, and the frequent reassertion of the common law rule doubtless
explains the infrequence of cases contesting the possibility of a civil
suit by the child. Cases abound commenting that the father has no
duty to support his illegitimate children except as provided by statute,
6
that such statutes are to be strictly construed,7 and that the rights and
remedies they provide are exclusive.8
In North Carolina the disparity between legitimate and illegitimate
children with respect to support and maintenance is striking. The
1230 N. C. 49, 52 S. E. 2d 18 (1949).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§49-1 through 49-4 (1943). The term "bastardy" statute
is misleading, bastardy being the mere begetting of an illegitimate child. Bastardy.
alone is no crime in North Carolina; there must be in addition willful non-support
of the child. State v. Bowser, 230 N. C. 330, 53 S. E. 2d 282 (1949) ; State v.
Stiles, 228 N. C. 137, 44 S. E. 2d 728 (1947).
'In the absence of contract, the child's only right to support from its putative
father is that created by the bastardy statute. See discussion, post.
'Simmons v. Bull, 21 Ala. 501, 56 Am. Dec. 257 (1852); Brown v. Brown,
183 Va. 353, 32 S. E. 2d 79 (1944).
Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923) ; amplified in Myers
v. Anderson, 145 Kan. 775, 67 P. 2d 542 (1937).
'Albanese v. Richter, 67 F. Supp. 771 (S. D. N. J. 1946) ; Law v. State, 238
Ala. 428, 191 So. 803 (1939; Myers v. Harrington, 70 Cal. App. 680, 234 Pac.
412 (1925); Washington v. Martin, 75 Ga. App. 466, 43 S. E. 2d 590 (1947);
State v. Lindskog, 175 Minn. 533, 221 N. W. 911 (1928) ; State v. Porterfield, 222
Mo. App. 553, 292 S. W. 85 (1927) ; Carlson v. Bartels, 143 Neb. 680, 10 N. W.
2d 671 (1943) ; Wynder v. Daniels, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 314 (1947) ; State v. Zimmer-
man, 67 Ohio App. 272, 36 N. E. 2d 808 (1941) ; State v. Boston, 69 Okla. Crim.
307, 102 P. 2d 889 (1940); Kordoski v. Belanger, 52 R. I. 268, 160 Atl. 205
(1932); Beaver v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 179, 256 S. W. 929 (1923); Brown v.
Brown, 183 Va. 353, 32 S. E. 2d 79 (1944). For collection of cases prior to 1923,
see Note, 30 A. L. R. 1069 (1924).7 Albanese v. Richter; Washington v. Martin; State v. Lindskog; Wynder v.
Daniels; State v. Zimmerman; supra note 6. For collection of cases prior to 1923,
see Note, 30 A. L. R. 1069 (1924).
' State v. Lindskog; Wynder v. Daniels; State v. Boston; Brown v. Brown;
supra note 7. For collection of cases prior to 1923, see Note, 30 A. L. R. 1069
(1924).
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father is charged with primary liability for the support of his legitimate
children, whether or not they have property, 10 and the duty is said to
exist until the child reaches twenty-one, at least,1' unless there has been
a complete emancipation by mutual assent.' 2 His liability is not affected
by divorce, even though the mother is awarded custody.' 3  The duty
may be enforced in a civil suit brought by the mother 14 or by the child, 1r
or by motion in the cause by a divorced wife ;1 and criminal penalties
are provided for its breach.' 7  On the other hand, in the absence of
contract' 8 the illegitimate child's only right to support from its father
is that created by the bastardy statute.' 9 The only means for enforcing
this right is by criminal prosecution 2 0 which may be instituted by the
mother or her representative, or the superintendent of public welfare
(if the child is likely to become a public charge), but apparently not by
the child itself.21 The father's duty terminates when the child reaches
fourteen, and may terminate when it reaches three.22 In the litigation,
the child is seriously handicapped. Every element-paternity, non-
support, and willfulness-must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,2 3
and the right to appeal is denied except as granted to the state in other
criminal cases. 24
At early English common law, the illegitimate was a stranger to its
'Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947) ; Note, 26 N. C. L. REv.
202 (1948).
10 Burke v. Turner, 85 N. C. 500, 504 (1881) ; Haglar v. McCombs, 66 N. C.
346, 351 (1872) ; Walker v. Crowder, 37 N. C. 478, 487 (1843).
" Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947).
12 Honycutt v. Thompson, 159 N. C. 29, 74 S. E. 628 (1912). For what con-
stitutes mutual assent, see James v. James, 226 N. C. 399, 38 S. E. 2d 168 (1946).
Mutual assent is not required if the child marries or enlists in the armed services,
the new relationship being inconsistent with the continuance of the parent-child
relationship.
13 Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936) ; Sanders v. Sanders,
167 N. C. 319, 83 S. E. 490 (1914).
"
4 Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947).
"
5 Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936).
"Winfield v. Winfield, 228 N. C. 256, 45 S. E. 2d 259 (1947).
1N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-322 (1943), as amended by N. C. Sess. Laws 1949,
c. 810; N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-325 (1943).
1 Regarding the father's contract to support his illegitimate child, see Conley
v. Cabe, 198 N. C. 298, 151 S. E. 645 (1930) ; Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N. C. 161,
150 S. E. 881 (1929) ; Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N. C. 502, 127 S. E. 553 (1925).
10 Allen v. Hunnicutt, 230 N. C. 49, 52 S. E. 2d 18 (1949). And even ths
right was created incidentally, said the court, the purpose of the statute being
to prevent illegitimates from becoming public charges.20 Allen v. Hunnicutt, supra note 19.
2" N. C. GEN. STAT. §49-5 (1943) seems to be exclusive, but the point has not
yet been decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
" N. C. GEN. SrAT. §49-4 (1943), as revised by N. C. Sess. Laws 1945, c.
1053.
" State v. Ellison, 230 N. C. 59, 52 S. E. 2d 9 (1949) ; State v. Spillman, 210
N. C. 271, 186 S. E. 322 (1936); State v. Cook, 207 N. C. 261, 176 S. E. 757
(1934).
'4 State v. Morris, 208 N. C. 44, 179 S. E. 19 (1935).
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parents, neither owing it any duty of support. 25  In most jurisdictions
today the courts have imposed a non-statutory duty upon the mother.26
But the common law rule as to the father has been altered by judicial
action in only one state.2 7
To mitigate the harshness of the common law, legislation has been
enacted in almost every state, affording various means of compelling
the father to contribute to the support of his illegitimate child. A great
many states have adopted bastardy laws somewhat similiar to those in
North Carolina.2 8  The action is usually civil in nature, though brought
in the name of the state, and usually is instituted by the mother, or by
the public authorities. Trial by jury is almost universal, and the mother
is always a competent witness. North Carolina seems to be unique in
making willful non-support an essential element; in other states the only
issue is the question of paternity. The consequence of "conviction" is
an order to support the child, enforceable by imprisonment, contempt
proceedings, and attachment levied under execution. Often provision
is made for release from prison after taking the pauper's oath.
Eight states have adopted variously modified versions of the Uni-
form Illegitimacy Act.29 This act in detail imposes upon both parents
2 Murrell v. Industrial Commission, 291 Il. 334, 126 N. E. 189 (1920);
Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923); State v. Tieman, 32
Wash. 294, 73 Pac. 375 (1903). A few cases have indicated an opinion that at
common law the mother has always had the responsibility of maintaining her
child. State v. Porterfield, 222 Mo. App. 553, 292 S. W. 85 (1927).
2 Davis v. Herrington, 53 Ark. 5, 13 S. W. 215 (1890) ; Beckett v. State, 5
Ind. App. 136, 30 N. E. 536 (1892) ; State v. Porterfield, supra note 25; Jaffe v.
Deckard, 261 S. W. 390, 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). It has been held, however,
that in the absence of statute neither parent has the duty of support. Murrell v.
Industrial Commission, supra note 25.
27 Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923). In Barrett v. Bar-
rett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P. 2d 621 (1934) the court used language suggesting that
had not the legislature already legitimatized all children, it might have followed
Doughty v. Engler and changed the common law in Arizona.
8 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§1 et seq. (1940); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§34-701 et
seq. (1947) ; COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 20, §§1 et seq., c. 83, §§1 et seq. (1935) ; CONN.
Ry. GEN. STAT. §§8178 et seq. (1949); DEL. REV. CODE §§3558 et seq. (1935);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§74201 et seq. (1944); GA. CODE ANN. §§74-301 et seq. (1935);
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 17, §§1 et seq. (1934) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§62-2301 et
seq. (1935) ; Kxy. REv. STAT. §§406-010 et seq. (1948) ; ME. REv. STAT. c. 153,§§23 et seq. (1944); Mn. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 12, §§1 et seq. (1939);
MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 273, §§11 et seq. (1932); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§25.451 et
seq. (Henderson 1937) ; MINN. STAT. §§257.18 et seq. (Henderson 1945) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. §§383 et seq. (1942) ; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §§12267 et seq. (1935) ;
N. H. REv. LAWS c. 128, §§1 et seq. (1942) ; OHIo GEN. CODE ANN §§12110 et
seq. (1938); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§71 et seq. (1936); ORE. ComP. LAWS
ANN. §§28-901 et seq. (1940) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4732 (1945) ; R. I. GEN.
LAWS c. 424, §§1 et seq. (1938) ; S. C. CODE ANN. §§1726 et seq. (1942) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. §11936 (Williams 1934) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§14-2-1 et seq. (1943) ;
VT. STAT. §§3265 et seq. (1947) ; WASu. REV. STAT. ANN. §§1970 et seq. (1931) ;
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§4770 et seq. (1943); Wis. STAT. §§166.01 et seq. (1947).
2" IN . ANN. STAT. §§3-623 et seq. (Bums 1933); IOWA CODE §§675.1 et seq.(1949) ; Nmv. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§3405 etseq. (1929); N. M. STAT. ANN. §§25-401
et seq. (1941); N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§119 et seq. (1941); N. D. Ray. CODE
§§32-3601 et seq. (1943) ; S. D. CODE §§37.2101 et seq. (1939) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT.
ANN. §§58-401 et seq. (1945).
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the duty to support their illegitimate children, enabling the mother ol
third parties to maintain a civil action against the putative father to
force him to contribute to support, or to recover for support furnished.
Liability is extended to the father's estate under certain conditions. The
act contains full and effective means for enforcing the father's duty,
and is well adapted to meet the problem of the absconding father.
Broad statutory duties are imposed in California and New Jersey.30
In Louisiana the statute says that fathers owe "alimony" to their illegiti-
mate children "when they are in need."3 1  In Nebraska the father has
the same duty as if the children were legitimate, after paternity has
been judicially established.3 2 And in Arizona every child is the legiti-
mate child of its natural parents and is entitled to support and education
as if born in lawful wedlock.33
Modern conceptions of social obligations are far advanced from
those in the days when the common law was formulated. A re-
examination of the basic considerations underlying the discrimination
between legitimate and illegitimate children would not seem inappropri-
ate. Various arguments have been advanced in support of the common
law rule.. It has been said that "the reason for the rule that the putative
father could not be made to support his bastard child was the uncer-
tainty of its paternity. '34  The difficulty of establishing fatherhood is
recognized. The question of what degree of proof should be required
and what evidence should be admissible is not within the scope of this
note; but once paternity has been established, the difficulty of doing so
seems an unsatisfactory basis for further discrimination.
It has been argued that the policy of discrimination between illegiti-
mate and legitimate children fosters the institution of marriage, and
serves as a deterrent to illicit cohabitation. 35  If so, its effect has been
negligible.36 Logic reasons and experience demonstrate that a more
likely stimulus would be provided by direct action against the offenders.
Perhaps it was supposed that vicarious suffering would torture the con-
science of the wrongdoers. But to punish innocent children, on the
unreasonable hope that their suffering would touch the unscrupulous
heart, would seem a rather barbarous way of enforcing social concepts.
"CAL. CiV. CODE §196a (1941); N. J. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§16-1 et seq.
(1939).
"LA. Cir. CODE AN. art. 202 through 212, art. 238 through 245 (1945).
"NEB. REv. STAT. §§13-101 et seq. (1943).
"AIz. CODE ANN. §§27-401 et seq. (1939).
" Jaffe v. Deckard (Tex. Civ. App.), 261 S. W. 390, 397 (1924) ; Kimbrough
v. Davis, 16 N. C. 71, 76 (1827).
" Flintham v. Holder, 16 N. C. 345, 348 (1829).
" The North Carolina Bureau of Vital Statistics reports that in 1948 there
were 108,834 births reported, 8,254 of which were illegitimate. 7.58 percent of
the children born in 1948 were illegitimate at birth. This figure does not in-
clude children of marriages which are void ipso facto, or declared void ab initio,
nor those children who are later bastardized by proof of non-access of the husband.
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It has been argued that the duty to support grows out of the marital
relation, not out of parentage. If so, it is difficult to see why the burden
of support is cast upon the unwed mother. North Carolina holds that the
duty to support legitimate children is the natural consequence of parent-
hood, and arises from the mere act of bringing the child into the world
unable to care for itself.3 7 This reasoning is equally applicable to illegiti-
mate children. As the Kansas court said in Doughty v. Engler,38 "A
sufficient reason for holding parents to be under a legal obligation, apart
from any statute, to support their legitimate child while it is too young
to care for itself, is that the liability ought to attach as a part of their
responsibility for having brought it into being, If that reason is not
found convincing it would be useless to seek others; and it does not in
the least depend for its force upon the fact that the parents were mar-
ried to each other."
Finally, it has been suggested that the duty to support is the re-
ciprocal of the right to custody.3 9 This view has been expressly
repudiated by some courts. 40 The duty to support one's children should
be regarded as part of the responsibility of parenthood, not as the price
the parent must pay for custody.41
Aside from its logical inconsistency and its injustice to the child,
the systematic discrimination which characterizes our legislative policy
toward illegitimates is seriously detrimental to the public welfare.
Economically it is a policy which tends to pauperize North Carolina
citizens. Socially we have added to inevitable ridicule and ostracism,
legal burdens and disadvantages more likely to create menaces to, than
useful members of, society. It is submitted that the responsibility for
having brought the illegitimate child into being, coupled with its in-
ability to care for itself, constitute sufficient reasons for imposing upon
both parents the duty of supporting it.
LLOYD S. ELKINS, JR.
"Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947) ; accord, Barrett v. Bar-
rett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P. 2d 621 (1934); Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211
Pac. 619 (1923); Buckninster v. Buckminster, 38 Vt. 248, 88 Am. Dec. 652(1865).
" 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923).So Jaffe v. Deckard (Tex. Civ. App.), 261 S. W. 390, 397 (1924) ; see Doughty
v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923).
" Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P. 2d 621 (1934) ("'We believe that the
enlightened legal concept of the present day is that parentage in and of itself
imposes a legal duty of support to minor children."); Gibson v. Gibson, 18 Wash.
489, 51 Pac. 1041 (1898).
"' It will be noted that in North Carolina when the mother is awarded the cus-
tody of legitimate children in a divorce action, the father's primary liability for
their support is unaffected. Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936).
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Evidence-Criminal Prosecutions-Rule Excluding Other Crimes
Defendant was indicted for murder. Evidence was admitted, over
objection, that the defendant had confessed that he was an escaped pris-
oner from the South Carolina Penitentiary where he was under life
sentence for murder. The trial judge charged the jury to consider such
evidence only as it might bear on the motive and intent of the defendant
in relation to the alleged killing. The defendant offered no evidence.
Upon conviction and appeal, held, error to admit such evidence because
"the record is barren of any evidence to connect the offense charged
with the defendant's past criminal record"; judgment reversed, case
remanded for new trial.1 State v. Kelly,2 where evidence of previous
escape was held properly admitted, was expressly modified although the
court suggested that "distinguishing differences" existed.3
In the principal case the court states the rule excluding evidence of
other crimes or acts of misconduct in criminal prosecution as a broad
rule of exclusion4 with certain "well recognized" exceptions.5 The ex-
ceptions, upon close analysis, prove to be the criteria in the determination
of the relevancy of the previous offense to the offense charged; that is,
design or plan, knowledge or belief, intent, motive, identity, or other
acts which are an inseparable part of the whole deed." The basic rule
of relevancy favors the admissibility of all facts affording any reason-
able inference to the act charged with the exception of the character
rule which excludes conduct tending and offered to show bad moral
character or disposition. 7 Obviously, the court has inverted the criteria
of relevancy through which the basic rule operates into categories of
exceptions to a broad rule of exclusion. In place of the inquiry, "Is
this evidence relevant otherwise than merely through propensity (to
1 State v. Fowler, 230 N. C. 470, 53 S. E. 2d 853 (1949). The State contended
that this evidence shows or reasonably infers that defendant's motive was his fear
that the deceased knew about his escape from the South Carolina prison. See
Brief for the State-Appellee, p. 6. On second trial, defendant's plea of guilty to
accessory before the fact was accepted by State. Minute Docket 30, p. 405,
August 1949 Criminal Term of the Superior Court of Moore County.
2216 N. C. 627, 6 S. E. 2d 533 (1940). See note 15 post.
' State v. Fowler, 230 N. C. 470, 475, 53 S. E. 2d 853, 857 (1949).
" "We start with the general rule that evidence of one offense is inadmissible
to prove another and independent crime, the two being wholly disconnected and
in no way related to each other." Id. at 473, 53 S. E. 2d at 855.
' "To this general rule, however, there is the exception as well established as
the rule itself, that proof of the commission of other like offenses is competent to
show the quo animo, intent, design, guilty knowledge or scienter, or to make out
the res gestae, or to exhibit a chain of circumstances in respect of the matter on
trial, when such crimes are so connected with the offense charged as to throw
light upon one or more of these questions." Ibid.
'1 WIGmORE, EvIDENCE §§217, 218 (3d ed. 1940). The six criteria listed in
the text are the most common ones; for others, see ibid. See also STANSBURY,
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §92 n. 62 (1946 ed.).
" 1 WIGMORE, EVIDEN C §§10, 194, 216 (3d ed. 1940).
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commit a similar crime) ?" there is substituted the inquiry, "Does this
evidence fall within any exceptions to the rule of exclusion?" In so
doing, the court's statement of the rule has, in the past, tempted judges
to dispense altogether with the test of relevancy, even though the ques-
tion still must be asked under the latter inquiry, "Is the evidence offered
relevant to show intent, etc. ?"8 The resulting confusion has admittedly
beclouded the rule itself by making its application more difficult and
uncertain.9 The premise upon which the rule was founded is directed
toward the prevention of proof of guilt by proof of propensity to com-
mit similar crimes.' 0 Yet this very object of the rule excluding evi-
dence of similar crimes in criminal prosecutions when relevant merely
to show propensity is forgotten and the test of relevancy is by-passed
when courts pay too close attention to the list of exceptions." The
courts are prone to use the categorical exceptions as catch-alls where
it is felt that substantial justice has been accomplished in the light of
the accused's character: "He's a bad character anyway !" Such a dis-
position on the part of the courts is assuredly not in accord with what
has been called one of the distinguishing features of the Anglo-American
criminal law-the recognition and avoidance of the deep tendency of
human nature to punish, not because the victim is guilty of the crime
charged, but because he is a bad man, and may as well be condemned
now that he is caught.1
2
Although Mr. Chief Justice Stacy, in the principal case, formulates
the rule of exclusion in its troublesome context, he has rendered a dis-
tinguished service toward the clarification of the confusion that existed
in the application of the rule by recalling that, "The exception requires
a more relevant base than the mere disposition of the accused to commit
such crimes. . . . The touchstone is logical relevancy as distinguished
from certain distraction.' 3  Thus, he reinstates the principles of
relevancy and the doctrines of auxiliary policy14 in the rule excluding
evidence of other crimes offered in criminal prosecutions in North
Carolina.
At the same time he recognizes with admirable frankness that a
number of North Carolina cases have been inconsistent in the applica-
tion of the rule. The four cases' 5 selected by the Chief Justice for this
'Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV.
L. REv. 988, 1005 (1938).
' Ibid.; State v. Fowler, 230 N. C. 470, 473, 53 S. E. 2d 853, 855 (1949).
10 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §194 (3d ed. 1940).
" Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HAgv.
L. REV. 988, 1006 (1938).
"1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§57, 194 (3d ed. 1940).
13 State v. Fowler, 230 N. C. 470, 473, 53 S. E. 2d 853, 855 (1949).
142 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §1906 (3d ed. 1940).
" State v. Edwards, 224 N. C. 527. 31 S. E. 2d 516 (1944) (defendant charged
with incest and carnal knowledge of his daughter; evidence that defendant had
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criticism are striking reminders of that jurisprudential reasoning which
blindly applies the exceptions to a broad rule of exclusion as though
the exceptions were nothing more than well worn cliches used to cloak
the particular court's personal estimate of the defendant. Relevancy is
ignored; the object of the rule defeated.
Approximately seventy cases in North Carolina have involved the
rule excluding evidence of other crimes in criminal prosecution; of that
number fifty-two cases admitted the evidence and eighteen cases held
the evidence inadmissible.' 6 One might wish that the Chief Justice had
mentioned several other North Carolina decisions that confuse the pic-
made improper advance of a similar nature to older daughter on prior occasions
admitted by trial court to show "intent or guilty knowledge"; affirmed by Supreme
Court as evidencing "intent as well as the unnatural lust of the defendant in at-
tempting to commit the crimes charged in the bill" [emphasis supplied]; State v.
*Biggs, 224 N. C. 722, 32 S. E. 2d 352 (1944) (defendants charged with murder
in commission of robbery; evidence tending to show that the three defendants on
a date twenty-seven days after the homicide perpetrated a hold-up and robbery
in same manner and same method as used in first robbery admitted by trial court
on the question of "intent, guilty knowledge and identification"; affirmed by Supreme
Court as "competent for the purpose to which limited ... to show the identity
of the persons . . ."; evidence of an attempt of one of the defendants to escape
from jail while awaiting trial was admitted by trial court and not questioned by
Supreme Court) ; State v. Kelly, 216 N. C. 627, 6 S. E. 2d 533 (1940) (defendants
charged with murder in commission of robbery; evidence that one of the defend-
ants was an escaped prisoner and that he had escaped with a co-conspirator killed
in the robbery admitted by trial court and approved by Supreme Court to "show
quo anino, intent, design, or guilty knowledge.. .") ; State v. Flowers, 211 N. C.
721, 192 S. E. 110 (1937) (defendants charged with conspiracy to rob by means
of assault with firearms; evidence that a week after the alleged robbery the
state's witness and defendant conspired to burn and did burn an automobile to
defraud insurance company admitted by trial court to "show identity or guilty
knowledge"; affirmed by Supreme Court without specifying which exception to
rule of exclusion applicable).
16 The following cases represent decisions applying the rule of exclusion in
North Carolina and supplement those cases cited in Note, 16 N. C. L. REv. 24
(1937) :
A. Evidence held inadmissible:
State v. Choate, 228 N. C. 491, 46 S. E. 2d 476 (1948) (abortion and murder;
evidence tending to show commission by defendant of other distinct and independent
offenses of similar nature admitted originally by trial judge but subsequently jury
instructed to disregard; reversible error); State v. Godwin, 224 N. C. 846, 32
S. E. 2d 609 (1945) (conspiracy to murder; evidence: defendant's profane com-
ments on previous fire); State v. Wilson, 217 N. C. 123, 7 S. E. 2d 11 (1940)
(embezzlement; evidence: statements by judge and foreman of grand jury sug-
gesting irregularities in public guardianship account and order of court removing
defendant as public guardian on grounds of mismanagement); State v. Lee, 211
N. C. 326, 190 S. E. 234 (1937) (maliciously burning a barn; evidence: indictment
of defendant on previous occasion for assault with a deadly weapon).
B. Evidence held admissible:
State v. Davis, 229 N. C. 386, 50 S. E. 2d 37 (1948) (fornication and adultery;
evidence: similar attempts on another person) ; State v. Biggs, 224 N. C. 722, 32
S. E. 2d 352 (1944) (facts stated in note 15 supra) ; State v. Edwards, 224 N. C.
527, 31 S. E. 2d 516 (1944) (facts stated in note 15 supra) ; State v. Harris, 223
N. C. 697, 28 S. E. 2d 232 (1947) (murder; evidence: that defendant shot and
killed three people at same place in a matter of seconds); State v. Batson, 220
N. C 411, 17 S. E. 2d 511, 139 A. L. R. 614 (1941) (attempt to commit barratry;
evidence: testimony that defendant had urged others to enter into suits) ; State
v. Kelly, 216 N. C. 627, 6 S. E. 2d 533 (1940) (facts stated in note 15 mspra);
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ture and becloud the application of the broad rule of exclusion ;17 but
an even more commendable desire is that the principal case may be used
as a precedent for the reaffirmation in principle of the basic rule favor-
ing the admissibility of all relevant facts, with the character rule ex-
ception, unhampered by the illogical and inconsistent applications of the
so-called exceptions to a broad rule of exclusion. The result would
merely be the adaptation of the court's understanding of the present
phraseology of the rule of exclusion to that statement of the basic rule
already accepted by many state courts,' 8 the federal courts,19 the Model
Code of Evidence20 and by leading text-writers on evidence :21
"Evidence of other offenses is inadmissible if its only rele-
vancy is to show the character of the accused or his disposition
to commit an offense of the nature of the one charged; but if it
tends to prove any other relevant fact it will not be excluded
merely because it also shows him to have been guilty of an inde-
penden crime. '22
0. MAX GARDNER, JR.
State v. Payne, 213 N. C. 719, 197 S. E. 573 (1938) (murder of highway patrol-
man in process of escaping from him; evidence: subsequent escapes by defendants
from highway patrolmen involving a shooting duel, weapons taken from defend-
ant's car 4Y2 months after murder exhibited to jury piece by piece) ; State v. Smoak,
213 N. C. 79, 195 S. E. 72 (1938) (murder of daughter by strychnine poisoning;
evidence: insurance on life of daughter, defendant had insured lives of first and
second wives successively and had collected insurance after second wife died of
strychnine poisoning, first wife in last illness stated in defendant's presence that
she had been poisoned, a third person upon whose life defendant had taken out in-
surance policy had serious but not fatal attack of strychnine poisoning) ; State v.
Flowers, 211 N. C. 721, 192 S. E. 110 (1937) (facts stated in note 15 supra);
State v. O'Higgins, 178 N. C. 708, 100 S. E. 438 (1919) (elopement with married
woman; evidence: abandonment of motherless child by defendant to elope with
woman); State v. Wade, 169 N. C. 306, 84 S. E. 768 (1915) (fornication and
adultery; evidence: previous sexual intercourse); State v. Broadway, 157 N. C.
598, 72 S. E. 987 (1911) (incest; evidence: other acts of intercourse); State v.
White, 89 N. C. 462 (1883) (larceny of hogs; evidence: neighbors of defendant
lost hogs about same time that defendant had sold dressed hogs, defendant had
denied and admitted the sale in same conversation).
7 E.g., State v. Davis, 229 N. C. 386, 50 S. E. 2d 37 (1948) (fornication and
adultery; evidence: testimony of another child in orphanage of which defendant
was superintendent that he had made similar attempts on her admitted by trial
court to show "attitude, animus and purpose." Affirmed by Supreme Court);
State v. Batson, 220 N. C. 411, 17 S. E. 2d 511, 139 A. L. R. 614 (1941) (attempt
to commit barratry; evidence: incitements to litigation other than those specific-
ally charged held admissible to show "intent, motive and scienter"); State v.
Payne, 213 N. C. 719, 197 S. E. 573 (1938) (murder of a highway patrolman in
process of escaping from him; evidence: subsequent escapes from highway patrol-
men involving a shooting duel admitted as "tending to show the state of mind of
the defendants at the time of the killing." Evidence of weapons captured in car
with defendants 42 months after killing admitted, weapon by weapon, beforejury. E.g., cases collected in Note, 22 TEMP. L. Q. 459 (1949) ; Stone, The Rule
of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938).
" Lovely v. United States, 169 F. 2d 386 (C. C. A. 4th 1948) ; Note, 22 TEmp.
L. Q. 459 (1949).2 0 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 311 (1942).
211 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §216 (3d ed. 1940); STANSnURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE §91 (1946 ed.).2
' STANSDURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §91 (1946 ed.).
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Federal Jurisdiction-Constitutional Law-Diversity of Citizenship
for District of Columbia and Territories
An insurance company, incorporated in the District of Columbia,
brought action in the Federal District Court for the District of Mary-
land. Plaintiff based its claim to federal jurisdiction on a 1940 Act of
Congress which amended the JUDICIAL CODE.1 The District Court, re-
fusing to accept the jurisdiction conferred by Congress in this statute,
dismissed the action on the premise that the statute grants judicial
power not authorized by the Constitution of the United States.2 This
decision was affirmed by the court of appeals, with Judge John J.
Parker dissenting, on essentially the same ground upon which the Dis-
trict Court relied 3 A divided Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the lower courts and held the 1940 Act constitutional. 4
The Judiciary Article of the Constitution nowhere recites that fed-
eral jurisdiction is extended to citizens of the District of Columbia or
of the territories by reason of diversity of citizenship.5 In 1792, the
Supreme Court in Hayburn's case6 laid down the proposition that judicial
power of federal courts is derived exclusively from the Judiciary
'The 1940 Act provided that district courts have original jurisdiction of suits
of a civil nature where the matter in controversy is between citizens of different
states, "or citizens of the District of Columbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or
Alaska, and any state or territory . . . ," 54 STAT. 143 (1940). Prior to the 1940
Act the JUDICIAL CODE provided that district courts should have original juris-
diction of suits of a civil nature where the matter in controversy ". . . is between
citizens of different states . . . " and made no mention of either District of Colum-
bia or the territories. The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Repre-
sentatives, reporting the 1940 Statute, stated, "It gives to the citizens of the
District of Columbia and of Hawaii and Alaska the same right to bring a suit in a
Federal district court of any State on the ground of diversity of citizenship as
now obtains in the case of a citizen of a state." H. R. REP. No. 1756, 76th Cong.,
3rd Sess. (1940).
'No opinion filed by District Court which relied upon its former decision in
Feely v. Sidney S. Schupper Interstate Hauling System, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 663
(D. Md. 1947). Eleven Federal courts had previously considered the question.
Eight held the 1940 Act unconstitutional: Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n. v.
Dailey, 75 F. Supp. 832 (D. Mass. 1948) ; Feely v. Sidney S. Schupper Interstate
Hauling System, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 663 (D. Md. 1947) ; Willis v. Dennis, 72 F.
Supp. 853 (W. D. Va. 1947); Wilson v. Guggenheim, 70 F. Supp. 417 (E. D. S. C.
1947) ; Central States Co-op. v. Watson Bros. Transportation Co., 165 F. 2d 392
(7th Cir. 1947) (Judge Evans dissenting); Ostrow v. Samuel Brilliant Co., 66
F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1946); Behlert v. James Foundation, 60 F. Supp. 706
(S. D. N. Y. 1945); McGarry v. Bethlehem, 45 F. Supp. 385 (E. D. Pa. 1942).
Contra: Duze v. Wooley. 72 F. Supp. 422 (D. Hawaii 1947); Glaeser v. Acacia
Mut. Life Ass'n., 55 F. Supp. 925 (N. D. Cal. 1944); Winkler v. Daniels, 43 F.
Supp. 265 (E. D. Va. 1942).
' National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 165 F. 2d 531 (4th Cir.
1947).
'National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 1173 (1949);
Siegmund v. General Commodities Corp., 175 F. 2d 952 (9th Cir. 1949).
' See U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §2. Citizens of the District of Columbia and the
territories have always had federal jurisdiction on grounds other than diversity
of citizenship. See DOME, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 186 n. 43 (1928).
62 DalI. 409 (U. S. 1792).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Article.7 In 1804, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Hepburn v. Ellzey8
supplemented this proposition with the hypothesis that the term "states,"
as used within that Article, excludes the District of Columbia and the
territories.9 Messrs. Justices Jackson, Burton and Black in the major-
ity opinion, while affirming the construction placed on the term "states"
by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, reached the conclusion that the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution is not the exclusive source of judicial power
for federal courts. In direct conflict with the conception stated in Hay-
burn's case, supra, they found the requisite authority to sustain the 1940
statute elsewhere in the Constitution. The late Messrs. Justices Rut-
ledge and Murphy, on the other hand, in a concurring opinion affirmed
the proposition set forth in Hayburn's case; and by defining the term
"states" to include the District of Columbia and the territories, they
overruled the opposite construction by Chief Justice Marshall in Hep-
burn v. ElIzey and held the 1940 Act valid.'
These divergent positions favoring the validity of the 1940 Act are
necessarily supported by independent arguments. First, the unusual pre-
ciseness of terminology of the provisions and the great talent of the
drafters emphasize that if the authors had desired Article III of the
Constitution to be the exclusive source of federal judicial power, they
would have so stated. They did not. On the contrary, in Articles I
and IV of the Constitution they conferred blanket power upon Congress
over the citizens of the District of Columbia and the territories, includ-
ing power over the judicial function." From this grant of judicial
power it is inferred that Congress may enlarge the jurisdiction of any
federal court to that extent necessary to protect the rights of these citi-
" Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697 (1864); United States v. Ferreira,
13 How. 40 (U S. 1851) ; Hodgson and Thompson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch 303
(U. S. 1809) ; cf., Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252 (U. S. 1867) ; Sheldon v.
Sill, 8 How. 441, 449 (U. S. 1850) ; Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dall. 12, 14 (U. S.
1800).
'2 Cranch 445 (U. S. 1804).
' New Orlans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91 (U. S. 1816); Barney v. Baltimore, 6
Wall. 280 (U. S. 1868) ; Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U. S. 395 (1897) ; In re Massa-
chusetts, 197 U. S. 482 (1905); cf., Watson v. Brooks, 13 F. 540 (C. C. Ore.
1882) (doctrine criticized).
"0 Six of the justices favored the doctrine in Haybums Case, including Justices
Rutledge, Murphy, Frankfurter, Reed, Vinson and Douglas. Seven of the justices
favored the construction in Hepburn v. ElIzey, including Justices Jackson, Burton,
Black, Frankfurter, Reed, Vinson and Douglas. The decisison resulted from the
fact that five of the justices, Jackson, Burton, Black, Rutledge and Murphy, con-
curred in result, though they disagreed on the basis-for the result.
" U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, §8, cl. 9 states that Congress shall have power to con-
stitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; U. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8, cd. 17
gives Congress power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,
over such district . . . as may . . . become the seat of the government of the
United States . . ."; U. S. CONST. Art. IV, §3, cl. 2 gives Congress power "to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory ...
belonging to the United States . . ."; U. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8, cl. 18 gives Con-
gress power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution these powers.
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zens.12 The extension of diversity jurisdiction is a valid and reasonable
exercise of this power.' 3
Second, by defining "states" to include the District of Columbia and
the territories for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, the source of
judicial power remains the Judiciary Article of the Constitution. Fur-
ther, the changing needs of a growing nation have undermined the
foundation of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's holding in Hepburn v.
Elizey that the term "states" does not include the District of Columbia
and the territories for diversity purposes. That holding is now sup-
ported only by its great age and the prestige of Chief Justice Marshall's
name, and it should now be overruled as the simplest way to achieve an
admittedly fair objective.
Both of these arguments are bolstered by a practical consideration.
If diversity jurisdiction for citizens of states is desirable, which has
been questioned,' 4 it would seem equally desirable to make that juris-
diction available to citizens of the District and the territories. By the
1940 Act these citizens, when no other basis for federal jurisdiction is
available, are made eligible to sue citizens of states in federal courts
instead of being compelled to sue in state courts. This is the principal
advantage granted by the Act to the citizens in question. Concededly,
this result may be accomplished by creation of special statutory courts
to hear these cases.' 5 Instead, Congress adopted the less expensive and
more practical expedient of vesting that jurisdiction in existing federal
courts. The means is justified in accomplishing an end admittedly
within the power of Congress.
The dissenting justices, Messrs. Frankfurter, Reed, Vinson and
Douglas, would continue unimpaired both the proposition of Hayburn's
case and the construction of the term "states" in Hepburn v. Elizey.
Their argument for the invalidity of the Act proceeds on the theory
1 This construction is not without implied judicial sanction. E.g., judges of
courts of the District" of Columbia (which were created under U. S. CoNsT. Art. I,
§8) come under the protection of U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §1. O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933). Judgments of the courts of the District are
to be accorded "full faith and credit" under U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, §1. Embry
v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3 (1882). Congress may impose a direct tax on the District
of Columbia, but not an oppressive tax, by reason of U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, §2.
Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317 (U. S. 1820).
2 C. J. Marshall gave color to this interpretation in a statement in Hepburn
v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445, 453 (U. S. 1804) made in reference to lack of diversityjurisdiction for citizens of the District: ". . . this is a subject for legislative, not
for judicial consideration (italics supplied)."
1, See Mr. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 525 (1928) : "The various types of diver-
sity litigation call for concrete scrutiny in the light of present day conditions and
the demands upon federal courts by peculiarly federal litigation. The right to re-
move to the federal court a litigation between two non-residents in a state court
will not survive analysis."
"*U. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8, cls. 17 and 18 (District of Columbia); U. S.
CONST. Art. IV, §3, cI. 2 (territories).
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that (a) the Judiciary Article is the exclusive source of federal juris-
diction, and (b) the Article does not provide for federal diversity
jurisdiction over citizens of the District of Columbia and the territories.
They contend that the language of Article III is explicit ;16 the authors
were distinguished lawyers capable of scrupulously exact draftsmanship;
the subject-matter is technical; each facet of judicial power authorized
was contested among the framers and distinctly circumscribed ;17 and it is
manifest, on the one hand, that Article III was not intended to be one
of those sections to which time and experience were to give content,
and, on the other hand, that it was to be the sole source of federal
judicial power. Article III does not purport to authorize federal diver-
sity jurisdiction for citizens of the District of Columbia or the terri-
tories; nor is there any indication that the term "states" means anything
other than those component parts forming the union which alone have
the power to amend the Constitution.' 8 From these premises it follows
that an act of Congress attempting to grant federal judicial privileges
to the citizens in question violates the Judiciary Article of the Con-
stitution and is invalid. Buttressing the logical argument is the practical
consideration that the detriment which will result from holding the Act
valid outweighs the advantages which will accrue to citizens of the Dis-
trict and the territories. The already overheavy workload of the federal
courts will be increased. More serious is the possibility that Congress
might use the precedent now established to further extend federal juris-
diction to include other duties heretofore considered precluded by the
Judiciary Article.1 Though it may be desirable to assure to all citi-
zens access to federal courts on an equal basis, that end would be
better achieved by more appropriate means.
20
Since the Supreme Court has upheld the 1940 Act it is pertinent to
consider its wording in conjunction with the 1948 revision of this statute.
" The precise phraseology of U. S. CoNsT. Art. III is in striking contrast with
phrases dealing with other vital aspects of government; e.g., "due process of
law," "commerce . . . among the several states," "necessary and proper."
" See Madison's defense of the Judiciary Article before the Virginia Conven-
tion, 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 216-225 (Hunt. ed. 1900).
"In Hepburn v. Elizey, 2 Cranch 445, 453 (U. S. 1804), C. J. Marshall in
construing the first judiciary Act to exclude citizens of the District of Columbia
said: ". . . members of the American Confederacy only are the states contem-
plated in the Constitution."
'" Justice Frankfurter asks: "... if the precise enumeration of cases as to which
Article III authorized Congress to grant jurisdiction to the United States District
Courts does not preclude Congress from vesting these courts with authority which
Article III disallows, by what rule of reason is Congress to be precluded from
bringing to its aid the advisory opinions of this Court or of the Court of Ap-
peals? .. . Why is not Congress justified in conferring original jurisdiction upon
this Court in litigation involving the exercise of its power to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper . . . " National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 1173. 1196, 1197 (1949).
20A constitutional amendment and special statutory courts offer alternative
solutions.
19491
132 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
The 1940 Act changed the JuDIcLA CODE to provide that district courts
have original jurisdiction of all suits of a civil nature where the matter
in controversy ". . is between citizens of different states, or citizens
of the District of Columbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, and
any state or territory. ... 21 Objections have been advanced that
the Act is ambiguous and subject to several interpretations.22 The
1948 revision 23 differs from the 1940 act on the question of federal
diversity jurisdiction in two respects.24 The words, "or citizens of
the District of Columbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, and any
state or territory," are omitted. The word "states," as used in the
section, is defined to include "the territories and the District of Colum-
bia." The 1948 revision leaves unchanged the basis upon which the
Supreme Court reached their decision in the principal case. The Court
referred to the 1948 revision as, in substance, re-enacting the 1940 Act.
2 5
The result of the 1940 Act as revised and construed is that the
citizens of the District of Columbia and the territories, on a showing
of diversity of citizenship between the parties, may sue in the federal
courts. Nevertheless, by means of a splitting of opinions, 20 the con-
ception of the Judiciary Article as the exclusive source of federal judicial
power and the limited construction of the term "states," as used in that
Article, considered individually, remain intact. While the basis is as
yet unsanctioned by legal principal approved by a majority of the jus-
tices, the Court by the purely mechanical device of a split majority
accomplished the result they desired without the delay of a constitutional
amendment or the complications attendant upon the creation of separate
special courts.
CLYDE T. ROLLINS.
Sales-Technical Cash Transaction-Vendor's Right to Recover
Property from Bona Fide Purchaser
Unless a contrary intention appears, promises for an agreed ex-
change which may be simultaneously performed are concurrently con-
ditional.1 It follows that, in a contract for the sale of a chattel where
11 54 STAT. 143 (1940). Italics supplied.
22A literal reading of the 1940 Act would indicate that, contrary to U. S.
CONsT. AMEND. XI, citizens of the District, Hawaii, and Alaska were authorized
to sue any state or territory in the district courts. The Act seemingly authorized
suits between two citizens of one territory in the federal courts. See McGarry
v. City of Bethlehem, 45 F. Supp. 385 (E. D. Pa. 1942).2228 U. S. C. §1332 (1948).
2, The revision removes the objection relating to a possible violation to U. S.
CoNsr. AMEND. XI. The revision precludes federal jurisdiction over suits be-
tween two citizens of one territory.
2 National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 1173, 1174
(1949).
" Se note 10, supra.
I RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §267 (1931).
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nothing is said about the time of payment, payment, tender, or waiver
of the purchase price is a condition on the right to demand delivery of
the chattel. 2  It is recognized that title to the property will pass, if
the parties so intend, upon completion of the contract irrespective of
the time of payment,3 and if so, then the vendor retains a possessory
lien and delivery of the chattel in expectation of immediate payment is
conditional on the payment being forthcoming.4  In some jurisdictions
this is the result where no evidence appears of any intention to
extend credit; that is to say, title passes but a possessory lien is retained. 5
Elsewhere, in the absence of an intent to extend credit, the transaction
is considered a "technical cash sale,"6 and neither title nor right to
possession passes to the buyer. Delivery to the buyer in expectation
of immediate payment extinguishes neither the seller's title nor his right
to possession.7
Independently of the-above, in the absence of a special agreement to
the contrary,8 a check or draft given in payment of an obligation is con-
ditional, not constituting payment unless it is itself paid upon due
presentationY This rule applies to obligations arising out of the imme-
diate transaction as well as to the payment of antecedent debts.', If
the check is not paid, the obligee may at his option recover on the instru-
ment or on the original obligation.'1
Although basically distinct,'12 this rule of payment has been incor-
2 UNIFORM SALES ACT §42; Ames v. Moir, 130 Ill. 582, 22 N. E. 535 (1889);
Wright v. Frank A. Andrews Co., 212 Mass. 186, 98 N. E. 798 (1912) ; Crumney
v. Raudenbush, 55 Minn. 426, 56 N. W. 1113 (1893) ; Hughes v. Knott, 138 N. C.
105, 50 S. E. 586 (1905) ; Grandy v. Small, 48 N. C. 8 (1855); VOLD, SALES 418
(1931) ; 2 WILLISTON, SALES §448 (rev. ed. 1948).
'UNIFORM SALES ACT §19, rule 1.
'Merrill Furniture Co. v. Hill, 87 Me. 17, 32 Atl. 712 (1894).
Warrick v. Liddon, 230 Ala. 253, 160 So. 534 (1935).
'VOLD, SALES 168 (1931).
"Davidson v. Furniture Co., 176 N. C. 569, 97 S. E. 480 (1918). It has been
held, in either case, that the condition may be waived, the vendee's title becoming
thereby absolute, by repeated efforts to obtain payment coupled with acquiescence
in the vendee's continued possession. Merrill Furniture Co. v. Hill, 87 Me. 17, 32
Atl. 712 (1894) ; Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67 AtI. 45 (1907).
' An agreement to accept a check as unconditional payment is not implied
from the surrender of a note marked "Paid." Little v. Mangum, 17 F. 2d 44
(4th Cir. 1927) ; Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 296 Fed. 339 (4th Cir.
1924); Hayworth v. Insurance Co., 190 N. C. 757, 130 S. E. 612 (1925); cf.
South v. Sisk, 205 N. C. 655, 172 S. E. 193 (1933) (note marked "Paid" and
mortgage "Cancelled") ; Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873, 189
S. E. 713 (1936) (bill of sale marked "Paid by two checks" held evidence from
which an innocent purchaser from the buyer might assume that checks had been
accepted as absolute payment).
' Manufacturers Finance Co. v. Armstrong, 78 F. 2d 289 (4th Cir. 1935);
Cleve v. Craven Chemical Co., 18 F. 2d 711 (4th Cir. 1927); Lumber Co. v.
Hayworth, 205 N. C. 585, 172 S. E. 194 (1933).
10 Standard Investment Co. v. Town of Snow Hill, 78 F. 2d 33 (4th Cir.
1935).Dewey v. Margolis, 195 N. C. 307, 142 S. E. 22 (1928).
12 "There is confusion of thought in supposing that the condition in conditional
payment by means of negotiable paper has any reference to the ownership of
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porated into "cash sale" transactions"3 with the result that, in any event,
whether intent for a cash sale is found expressed in the original agree-
ment or is presumed from the absence of contrary provisions, and
whether it is conceived that the vendor retains a lien on or the title to
the property, it is held that delivery of the chattel in return for a check
for the purchase price is conditional on the check being paid and that
upon the dishonor of the instrument the vendor may regain possession
of the property from the vendee or any other party with no greater
equities.
14
The controversial question arises whether the vendor in such a case
may assert his right to the property as against a bona fide purchaser
for value from the vendee without notice of the vendee's defect of title.
By majority rule' 5 the original vendor prevails in the absence of some
conduct amounting to estoppel.1 6  The minority hold that although, as
between the original parties, delivery is conditional, the rule is in-
applicable to subsequent purchasers for value in good faith.
17
In a recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals, 18 where a
check was given for the purchase price of an automobile at an auction
sale and upon due presentment was returned marked "insufficient funds,"
it was held that, although, as between the original parties, no title passes
until the check given for the purchase price in a cash sale is paid, un-
conditional delivery of the chattel to the vendee vests him with "ex-
ternal indicia" of the right of disposal, and that a subsequent sale to an
innocent purchaser either divests the vendor of his title' 9 or estops him
property given in exchange for the paper. The condition relates to the creditor's
right to revert to the money claim for which the negotiable paper was given."
2 WILLISTON, SALES 344 (rev. ed. 1948).
"3 "Without regard to the former presumption-that payment of the price is
a condition precedent to the passing of title to the goods-in many jurisdictions
it has been stated to be the rule at common law that a sale of goods is presumed
to be a sale for cash unless the seller agreed to allow a period of credit, and the
force of this presumption has been held to be unaffected by reason alone of the
intermission between receiving and cashing a check for the goods." Collins, Title
to Goods Paid for with Worthless Check, 15 So. CAL. L. REV. 340 at 343 (1942).
1' First National Bank v. Griffin, 31 Okla. 382, 120 Pac. 595 (1911) (bank
receiving the property with full knowledge of the transaction, at the same time
refusing to cash the vendee's check, held to have no greater equities) ; Mclver v.
Williamson-Halsell-Frasier Co., 19 Okla. 454, 92 Pac. 170 (1907) (attaching
creditor of the vendee).
'VOLD, SALES 174 (1931).
Barksdale v. Banks, 206 Ala. 569, 90 So. 913 (1921); Clark v. Hamilton
Diamond Co., 209 Cal. 1, 284 Pac. 915 (1930) ; Johnson v. Iankovetz, 57 Ore. 24,
110 Pac. 398 (1910) ; Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S. W. 125
(1924).
" Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1074, 300 N. W. 260 (1941);
Parr v. Helfrich, 108 Neb. 801, 189 N. W. 281 (1922); Comer v. Cunningham,
77 N. Y. 391, 33 Am. Rep. 626 (1879).
8 Blount v. Bainbridge, 79 Ga. App. 99, 53 S. E. 2d 122 (1949).
10 GA. CODE §96-207 (1933). "Where an owner has given to another such evi-
dence of the right of selling his goods as, according to the custom of the trade
or the common understanding of the world, usually accompanies the authority of
disposal, or has given the external indicia of the right of disposing of his property,
a sale to an innocent purchaser divests the true owner's title."
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from asserting it.2°  The court based its decision on two statutes21 in
the alternative.
Although North Carolina has recognized both the technical cash sale
doctrine22 and the rule that a check is conditional payment until it is
paid,m no local worthless check case has been found in which the vendor
maintained an action against an innocent purchaser of the property. In
Parker v. Trust Company,24 however, where, under facts similar to
those of the Georgia case,25 an agent of the vendee had resold the chattel
at a profit and remitted the proceeds to the administrator of the vendee
who had meanwhile committed suicide, the court said that no title
passed and that the vendor could either recover the specific property,
if not estopped,2G or ratify the subsequent resale and recover the pro-
ceeds thereof from the administrator who held them in trust for the
vendor, such resale being a conversion of his property. Although the
first of these alternatives is a dictum, under the circumstances of the
case, 2T it is enough to indicate that the North Carolina court would not
have reached the result of the Georgia decision. An endeavor will be
made to determine the reason.
That ancient and embattled maxim of the common law, caveat
emptor,28 having experienced considerable insecurity in England,29
seems to have taken refuge in a more hospitable America.30 The con-
20 GA. CODE §37-113 (1933). "When one of two innocent persons must suffer
by the act of a third person, he who put it in the power of the third person to
inflict the injury shall bear the loss."2 Notes 19 and 20, supra.
22 Davidson v. Furniture Co., 176 N. C. 569, 97 S. E. 480 (1918); Hughes v.
Knott, 138 N. C. 105, 50 S. E. 586 (1905).
2 E.g., Lumber Co. v. Hayworth, 205 N. C. 585, 172 S. E. 194 (1933).
24 229 N. C. 527, 50 S. E. 2d 304 (1948).
2 Blount v. Bainbridge, 79 Ga. App. 99, 53 S. E. 2d 122 (1949).
20 The vendor had assigned the certificate of title to the vendee. The action
was for the proceeds of the resale which amounted to more than the original sale
price.
27 See note 26, supra.
28 "Let the buyer beware." As between the immediate parties to a sale, this
doctrine has been seriously encroached upon by the recognition of implied war-
ranties of title, merchantability, and fitness for a particular purpose, but it re-
mains a potent weapon in the hands of the legal owner of property to be used
against a bona fide purchaser from one who has no title to convey.
2" A most serious English exception to the general rule embodied in caveat
emptor is market overt whereby a thief may convey a good title in a sale in an
"open market." This product of the law merchant, resulting in the increased
negotiability of goods, has been excused on the theory that the loser of goods is
bound to look in the market place and find them.. Pease, The Change of the
Property in Goods by Sale in Market Overt, 8 COL. L. REv. 375 (1908). A sim-
ilar civil law doctrine is expressed in words roughly translated as "possession
equals title" wherein even a donee, accepting goods in good faith from one in
possession, becomes the lawful owner. Franklin, La Possession Vaut Titre, 6
TULANE L. REv. 589 (1932).
"' "But we are not aware that this Saxon institution of markets overt, which
controls and interferes with the application of the common law, has ever been
recognized in any of the United States, or received any judicial sanction." Ven-
tress v. Smith, 10 Pet. 161, 176, 9 L. Ed. 382, 387 (1836).
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flict which has inevitably necessitated the almost imperceptible recession
of the doctrine has been attributed to the opposed considerations of the
protection of the ownership of property and the encouragement of
trade.3 ' The growth of transportation and commerce, which has per-
mitted industrial specialization and increased the interdependence of
people for necessities as well as luxuries, has adversely affected caveat
emptor by demanding a measure of security for the bona fide purchaser
of goods.3 2
But if the increased negotiability of goods would encourage freedom
of trade, it must be remembered that the transaction here under con-
sideration involves commercial paper, the security of which is deemed
essential to commerce as we know it a  Unlike a chattel, the value of
a check is not embodied in the physical instrument but depends upon
the protection the law gives it. A measure of this, at least, consists of
the seller's recourse against the specific chattel in the event a check re-
ceived therefor is not paid. If an increase in the negotiability of goods
would adversely affect the security of this type of commercial paper,3 4
""Security of property for the original owner has as a general rule been
accounted of greater importance to the general welfare than the possible resulting
freedom of commerce that might be achieved by protecting the transferee who
acquires the goods from a transferor who cannot rightfully convey." VOLD, SALES
396 (1931). Speaking of the common law, as contrasted to the civil law: ".. . it
is entirely conceivable that a legal system should choose to protect the security of
acquisitions at the expense of the security of transactions. In an agricultural
community where movable property is scarce, acquisition, not transaction, that is
property rather than contract, looms." Franklin, La Possession Vaut Titre, 6
TULANE L. REv. 589, 601 (1932). Market overt applies only to centers of trade,
principally in London. See Pease, The Change of the Property in Goods by Sale
in Market Overt, 8 CoL. L. REv. 375 (1908).
" Apparent ownership and apparent authority, as devices for protecting an
innocent purchaser, go beyond ordinary rules of estoppel. VoLD, SALES 401 (1931).
"In part, at least, they exemplify concessions to felt ne~eds for more largely sus-
taining security of transactions for the advantage of trade and commerce, haltingly
and gropingly made at the expense of security of property to the original owner.
To some degree at least they thus represent a fresh example of gropingly re-
placing caveat emptor by caveat doninu." Id. at 402.
. It has been estimated that ninety per cent of all business transactions in this
country are settled by check. As reported by the Federal Reserve Bulletin for
August, 1949, the total amount of money in circulation, including coin and paper
money of all denominations, reached a peak in November, 1948, of $28,331,00 ,000.
The total bank debits to customers' deposits, exclusive of interbank deposits, dur-
ing the year of 1948 is reported as $1,249,630,000,000.
"' "We feel safe in saying that, as a matter of custom and convenience, most
of the cash transactions of the country are paid with checks. A farmer brings in
his cotton, tobacco, or wheat to town for sale and sells same, and, as a general
rule, is paid by check, although all of such sales are treated as cash transactions.
If, in such a case, the purchasers can immediately resell to an innocent party and
convey good title, it would follow that vendors would refuse to accept checks
and would require the actual money, which would result in great inconvenience
and risk to merchants engaged in buying such produce, since it would require them
to keep on hand large sums of actual cash. This would result in revolutionizing
the custom of merchants in such matters." Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152
Tenn. 15, 268 S. W. 125 at 127, 54 A. L. R. 516, 526 (1924). For criticism of
this reasoning see Notes, 28 Ky. L. JOURNAL 322 (1940); 13 Mo. L. REv. 211(1948).
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the weight of such a consideration, when cast upon the scales in a
worthless check case, would line up with caveat emptor, both being
opposed to the negotiability of goods, and operate to deprive the innocent
purchaser of the goods. The result is an anomalous situation wherein
the security of acquisitions, rather than security of transactions, lends
its support to the free movement of trade.
WILLIS C. BUMGARNER.
Torts-Federal Tort Claims Act-Servcemens' Suits
In 1946 Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act.1 This
legislation is a sweeping waiver of governmental immunity from suits
sounding in tort.2 The Act makes the United States liable on "claims
for injury or loss of property or death caused by the negligent or wrong-
iul act or omission of any employee of the government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable .... " The Gov-
ernment is not to be liable in twelve enumerated instances. Among these
specific "exceptions" is a provision that the Act is to have no application
to "any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war." 4  The Act
makes no mention of veterans' or servicemens' claims except for the
indirect reference implicit in the language of this exception.
What is the status then of the serviceman-claimant under the Act?
The Supreme Court was faced with this question in Brooks v. U. S.5
Two soldiers, Welker and Arthur Brooks, were riding in an automobile
when they were hit at a highway intersection by an Army truck. At
the time of the accident the men were on leave and about their own
private affairs. It was held that the fact that plaintiffs were servicemen
would not preclude the maintenance of a suit under the Tort Claims
Act.6 "The statute's terms are clear," wrote Mr. Justice Murphy.
128 U. S. C. §§1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1948).
This legislation seems to have been passed with two main purposes in mind:(1) to relieve an over-burdened Congress from the necessity of considering hun-
dreds of private bills yearly (the only remedy available to the private citizen
before passage of the Act), and (2) to remove the previous barrier to suit against
the Government in tort, a reform which had been sought by statesmen and jurists
for more than a century. See generally, Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort, 26
N. C. L. REv. 119 (1948) ; Gellhorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Fed-
eral Government, 47 Col- L. Rnv. 722 (1947) ; Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims
Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L. J. 1 (1946) ; Note, 20 Miss. L. J. 354
(1949).
328 U. S. C. §1346(b) (1948).
'28 U. S. C. §2680 (1948). The exceptions fall loosely into two categories:
(1) claims which relate to certain governmental activities which should be free
from the threat of damage suit, or (2) claims for which adequate remedies are
already available. SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946).
69 S. Ct. 918 (1949).
Accord, Alansky v. Northwest Airlines, 77 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mont. 1948)(death of officer in the military forces killed in plane crash while being trans-
1949]
138 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol.28
"They provide for District Court jurisdiction over any claim founded
on negligence brought against the United States. We are not persuaded
that 'any claim' means 'any claim but that of servicemen.' " All but two
of the tort claims bills introduced in Congress between 1925 and 1935s
had contained a clause excepting claims cognizable under either the
Federal Employees' Compensation Act9 or the World War Veterans'
Act of 1924.10 The Act of 1946 contained such an exception when
introduced ;" but the provision, without ascertainable explanation, was
dropped from the Act as adopted.1 2 It seems apparent from both the
language and the legislative history of the Act that Congress did not
intend to place such claims beyond the Act's coverage.13
It had been argued by the Government that since there already ex-
isted an elaborate and adequate system of pensions and benefits for
servicemen,"4 it had not been intended to include such claims within
the framework of the Act. But the Court said that there is nothing in
the Act or the veterans' laws which provides for exclusiveness of rem-
edy.15 The Government then objected to recovery on the ground that
it would put the United States in the position of having to pay twice
for the same injury-the plaintiff Welker Brooks having been awarded
a disability allowance of $27.60 per month, and the mother of the de-
ceased Arthur Brooks having been paid a death benefit of $468 under
the Veterans' Act. The Court made it plain, however, that it would
not permit a double recovery, and the case was remanded to the Court
of Appeals for its consideration of the problem of reducing the dam-
ages pro tanto. In other words, the substantial recovery obtained by
the plaintiffs in the District Court 6 might be diminished by the modest
amounts already paid out in the form of benefits under the Veterans'
ported to Seattle where he was to be discharged) ; Samson v. U. S., 79 F. Supp.
406 (S. D. N. Y. 1947) (death of Army private whose injuries, not incident to
military service, were sustained when he was a passenger on a bus operated by
the War Dep't.).
"Brooks v. U. S., 69 S. Ct. 918, 919 (1949).
"For citation of these bills, see Brooks v. U. S., 69 S. Ct. 918 n. 2 (1949).
'39 STAT. 742 (1916), 5 U. S. C. §751 et seq. (1946).
1043 STAT. 607 (1924), 38 U. S. C. §§421-576 (1946).
I" H. R. 181, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
1The exceptions became §421 of the Legislative Reorganization Act, 28
U. S. C. §2680 (1948).
" See Judge John J. Parker, dissenting in U. S. v. Brooks, 169 F. 2d 840, 846
(4th Cir. 1948).
1' These laws are too numerous to be cited individually. See generally, KM-
BROUGE ANiD GLEN, AmERICAN LAW OF VETERANS (1946).
" Contra, Perucki v. U. S., 80 F. Supp. 959 (M. D. Pa. 1948); Wham v.
U. S., 81 F. Supp. 126 (D. D. C. 1948), where it is said: "When the United
States consents to be sued in tort, as it has by the Tort Claims Act, those mem-
bers of a class for which a comprehensive system of compensation has otherwise
been provided may not seek benefits under the Act."
" Welker was awarded $4,000; Arthur's estate $25,000.
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Act.17 It had also been argued that where a claimant has received
compensation under either the Federal Employees' Compensation Act or
the Veterans' Act, this would constitute an election of remedies and that
recovery under the Tort Claims Act would therefore be barred.'8 But
the Court said, "We will not call either remedy exclusive, nor pro-
nounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Congress has not done
so."' 9 And so the serviceman may accept compensation under the Vet-
erans' Act and then proceed under the Tort Claims Act. Thus the more
generous award is made available to the claimant.
The Brooks case is controlling only in cases in which the injuries
are not incident to military service. The Court stated: "Were the acci-
dent incident to the Brooks' service, a wholly different case would be
presented. '20 We can only speculate as to the result the Court will
reach when it is squarely faced with a case in which the plaintiff's in-
juries are incident to his service. The literal language of the Act could
easily embrace such injuries. The only section which feasibly could
apply to claims of the serviceman is Section 2680(j) which excepts all
claims "arising from combatant activities . . .during time of war." 21
Certainly there remains between the decision in the Brooks case and
the literal language of Section 2680(j) a wide area of possible claims.
Some of the lower courts have already probed into this twilight
zone. The District Court for the District of Maryland dealt with the
problem of a service-connected injury in Jefferson v. U. S.22 There
an ex-soldier sued the United States for injuries sustained in an opera-
tion performed on him by an Army surgeon. A towel 23/2 feet long by
132 feet wide was negligently left in the plaintiff's abdomen and was
" Just before press time the two Brooks cases were considered on remand.
U. S. v. Brooks, 176 F. 2d 482 (1949). The case of the deceased Arthur was
disposed of, the Court deducting the $468 death benefit payment but refusing to
deduct payments made through National Service Life Insurance. The case of
the injured Welker was remanded to the District Court for further findings of
fact since it did not appear to what extent, in making the award of damages, the
District Judge took into account hospital and medical expenses and disability
benefits.
"8 This argument is developed in Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 35
GEo. L. J. 1, 57 (1946). In Parr v. U. S.,'78 F. Supp. 693 (D. Kan. 1948), a
Government employee who had accepted compensation under the Federal Em-
ployees' Compensation Act later brought action under the Tort Claims Act. Held:
acceptance of compensation under the former Act constituted an "election," and
the present action was therefore barred. Cf. White v. U. S., 77 F. Supp. 316
(D. N. J. 1948), where employees of the War Dep't. recovered under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act before the effective d te of the Tort Claims Act.
Held: this did not constitute a waiver or an "election."
" Brooks v. U. S., 69 S. Ct. 918, 920 (1949).
20 Ibid.
"In Skeels v. U. S., 72 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. La. 1947), "combatant activ-
ities" was defined as actual conflict, not mere training activities, and plaintiff was
permitted to recover for death of his intestate (a civilian) who was killed when
an iron object fell from an Army plane engaged in tow target practice over the
Gulf of Mexico.
"'77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948).
1949]
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discovered nine months later when a similar operation was performed at
Johns Hopkins. The complaint was dismissed. Relying on House and Sen-
ate Committee Reports23 and after a consideration of the probable con-
sequences of allowing such suits, the court reasoned that Congress had not
contemplated the inclusion of claims for service-connected injury. In a
more recent case, Santana v. U. S.,2 4 the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held, on the basis of the decision in the Brooks case, that the
district court had jurisdiction, under the Tort Claims Act, of an action
for wrongful death of a discharged serviceman whose death was alleg-
edly caused by the negligence of Government employees at a Veterans
Administration Hospital. Here the deceased was not in service at the
time of the negligence complained of, and the court felt that inclusion
of the claim could involve no problem of the "subversion of military
discipline. ' 25  The Court further said, "With respect to the argument,
that Congress presumably did not intend to include discharged veterans
within the coverage of the Tort Claims Act, in so far as they already
are covered by a 'comprehensive system of special statutory benefits,'
the Supreme Court in its decision in the Brooks case ... expressly dis-
credited that argument, even as applied to servicemen. '20
In Perucki v. U. S. a United States district court sitting in Penn-
sylvania denied reeovery to a veteran seeking damages for an injury
allegedly received when he was undergoing examination in connection
with an appeal from a decision reducing his rate of disability. Plain-
tiff said he had received painful burns when a Veterans Administration
doctor tested his reflexes by applying lighted matches to both knees.
The court held the claim to be within the "combatant activities" ex-
ception because "the basis of the claim could not have arisen if it had
not been for the injury which the plaintiff sustained while engaged in
the combatant activities of the military forces. '28  Since the negligence
complained of occurred after discharge, it seems that the court came up
with a very strained construction of the exception in order to disallow
the plaintiff's claim.2 9
"SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946) ; H. R. REP. No. 1287,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1946).
2,4175 F. 2d 320 (1st Cir. 1949).
2;In U. S. v. Brooks, 169 F. 2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), the majority says at
845: "If soldiers could sue for such injuries as illness based on the alleged negli-
gence of the company cook or mess sergeant, or if soldiers who contract sickness
on wintry sentry duty had a right of action against the Government on the allega-
tion of a negligent order given by the company commander, then the traditional
grousing of the American soldier would result in the devastation of military dis-
cipline and morale."
20 Santana v. U. S., 175 F. 2d 320, 322 (1st Cir. 1949).
2T80 F. Supp. 959 (M. D. Pa. 1948).
28Id. at 961.
29 The District Court in the Santana case did not file an opinion for pub-
lication. The facts set out in the opinion of the Court of Appeals are meager,
and so it is not possible to determine whether the deceased veteran in the Santana
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Whatever the approach, whether by a narrowing of the literal lan-
guage of the Act as was done in the Jefferson case, or by a strained in-
terpretation of the "combatant activities" exception as in the Perucki
case, the courts have shown little disposition to push the Government's
liability as far as the literal language of the Act will admit. Undoubt-
edly the courts are concerned with the spectre of the floods of litigation
that will almost surely result if they do not adopt some limitative
criterion. Whether by accident or by design, the decisions to date
indicate a trend toward a criterion akin to that adopted in the Crown
Proceedings Act of 1947,30 the British Act waiving sovereign immunity.
The British Act exempts the Crown from liability when the serviceman
is injured while on duty or when the injury is incurred on military
premises.31 This criterion, if incorporated directly into our Act, would
hardly be open to the often-voiced objection that allowance of service-
men's claims will result in the subversion of military discipline, and at
the same time it would quiet the courts' fears as to the possibility of
floods of litigation.
JAMES L. TAPLY.
case was hospitalized in connection with a former combat injury or for some other
reason. It may be, then, that the Santana and Perucki cases are distinguishable
on the facts. Since the negligence complained of occurred after discharge in both
cases, the original basis for hospitalization or treatment would seem immaterial.
a 10 & 11 GEORGE VI, c. 44, §10 (1947).
ai Barnes, The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, CANr. B. REv. 387, 393 (1948).
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